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SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REST 
OF THE WORLD 
EUROPE 
(Based a paper presented by Sheila Page, a research 
fellow at the Overseas Development Institute, and general 
discussion by deLegates) 
As South Africa gradually riormalises its relations with the 
rest of the world, it wilj have to make several careful choices 
to ensure that it secures the best possible trade deal in a fast- 
changing world. 
There are several aspects to this. Because of sanctions it has 
very few bilateral trading arrangements, but the few that do 
exist will have to be re-negotiated in terms of changes in 
multilateral trade fora such as the General Agreeement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its possible admission to the 
Lomé Convention between the European Commission (EC) 
and the former colomes in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP). 
South Africa should, however, not expect too much from the 
EC, or from its possible change in status from a developed to 
a developing country once democratic rule is in place. 
The EC is undergoing a wide-ranging changes which, 
combined with recession, tend to make it intensely self- 
absorbed with little time or patience for hand-outs to 
developing countries. 
The changes include growing membership and the transition 
from a customs union to a common market, all of which 
create severe internal pressures and tensions. These 
developments are being carefully monitored by the ACP 
states, which are concerned that they are deflecting attention 
away from them. 
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South Africa could have an advantage because of the 
sympathy element and the fact that the best time to get 
privileges and access to any trading regime is soon after a 
major political change. This is when a country is most likely 
to be further up on the international agenda and when it is 
most likely to need special assistance and special access. 
What form this would take place should be determined 
quickly, during the transition period, when there could be 
maor problems, which might or might not be caused by 
trade but would certainly require assistance. 
But while there are advantages to be gained from pressing the 
BC hard for special access, they are nor as great as they might 
seem and might well be not worth the trouble fighting for. 
The EC countries do not have most favoured nation GATT 
trade with many countries. MFN is the lowest level of 
preference within the GATI' system and ensures that a tariff 
reduction to any one country is offered to all other countries 
that are GAiT members. The countries with which the EC 
has MFN trade include South Africa, the US, Australia and 
New Zealand. 
Most of EC trade takes place within the BC on the basis of 
complete freedom of movement within the EC, with a few 
exceptions such as the UK. 
There is also a range of reciprocal trade agreements wiLh 
countries in Europe outside the community. 
The EC has preferential trade 
agreements with the former colonies in 
the African-Caribbean-Pacific or ACP 
group through the Lomé Convetion, 
which provides for free entry for nearly 
all goods to the EC but not the other 
way around. There is a similar, but 
separate, set of arrangements with 
some of the North African countries, 
Turkey and Israel, which are on a 
strictly bilateral basis. 
Then there are the purely concessional 
arrangements, again preferential, but 
these are not even negotiated. The 
main one is the generalised system of 
preferences (GSP), and is usually 
granted to developing countries. 
GSP grants only preferential access, 
which normally means lower but not 
zero tariffs, and is subject to 
quantitative restrictions. For the least 
developed countries, there is Super 
GSP, which is a cross between GSP 
and Lomé status in that it offers 
unlimited access, with some 
exceptions, and lower tariffs. For 
political reasons, it has been extended 
temporarily to the Eastern European 
countries before they get associate 
status, and for a fixed period subject to 
renewal to the Andean Pact countries 
of South America and to Central 
America. 
If South Africa changes its status to 
that of a developing country, it would 
be eligible for GSP. Any special 
arrangement other than that would 
depend on how convincing an argument South Africa made, 
andwould have to be measured against how much extra the 
EC would give South Africa over and above what it would 
get under GSP anyway. 
It is unlikely that South Africa could claim to be a least 
developed country eligible for Super GSP. Because it is not 
on the EC border, it could not claim, like Bulgaria, that there 
would be mass migration unless special assistance was given. 
It could probably get something the basis of sympathy or on 
the basis of internal disruption. 
How important is the EC to South Africa? About a third of 
South Africa's exports go to the EC. Most of the 
exports are made up of gold, coal, platinum and diamonds. 
None of these face any significant tariffs, except for a 
few per cent on platinum, or non tariff barriers, except 
for coal, where for political reasons in Europe there are no 
preferences. So there is no advantage from any form of 
preference for about 60 per cent of the EC's imports from 
South Africa. 
The EC is not currently a major market for South African 
manufacturers. This is because the EC tends to have one of 
the lowest shares of imports of manufactures from all areas 
outside Europe, and because few South African 
manufcturers are internationally competitive at present 
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TOP TWENTY TRADERS WITH SA -1992 
(SA's Top Twenty Export destinations) 
RANKSA SA SA TOTAL RANK 
EXPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS TRADE TOTAL 
(R billion) (R billion) TRADE 
2 USA 4.8 7.1 11.9 1 
5 Germany 3 8.6 11.6 2 
3 U Kingdom 4.5 5.4 9.9 3 
4 Japan 3.7 5.6 9.3 4 
1 Switzerland 5.4 1.2 6.6 5 
6 Taiwan 2.1 1.8 3.9 6 
9 Italy 1.6 1.8 3.4 7 
8 Netherlands 1.9 1.2 3.1 8 
13 France 1 2.1 3.1 9 
7 Belgium 2 1.1 3.1 9 
10 ZImbabwe 1.6 0.8 2.4 11 
11 Hong Kong 1.5 0.8 2.3 12 
14 South Korea 0.9 0.7 1.6 13 
15 Spain 0.9 0.4 1.3 14 
16 Israel 1.0 0.3 1.3 15 
12 Zambia 1.1 0.04 1.1 16 
17 Malawl 0.7 0.13 0.8 20+ 
18 Mozamblque 0.7 0.05 0.7 20+ 
19 CIS 0.6 0.07 0.7 20+ 
20 Norway 0.5 0.03 0.5 20 + 
An ODI study last year indicated that of 37 exports valued at 
more than $25 million, only 12 would gain from a preference 
regime. 
This, however, is based on South Africa's existing trade 
structure at a time when it is planning to change its trade 
structure drastically over the next few years. So what matters 
is not only preferences for existing exports, but preferences 
for new exports. 
But if one examines the development of the NICs, which 
have not had the preferences that the ACP states have had, it 
is difficult to argue that preferences are essential for rapid 
export growth. The NICs found that it was their exports into 
the US and Japan that increased most rapidly, and this was 
because these countries were more open to manufactured 
imports. 
For the next generation of NICs - for example, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Mauritius and Colombia - it was also much easier 
to get into the US market than the EC market. 
An aspect of the Lomé Convention that South Africa should 
consider is that it allows ACP states to accumulate 
production so that the value added rules and the rules of 
origin apply to the final product which has been partially 
made in one ACP country, and partially made in another. 
In terms of regional strategies, this could be a powerful 
argument for South Africa having the same status as its 
neighbours so that they could plan their production together. 
But there are two arguments against this. First, this has been 
virtually unused by the ACP countries so far, and, secondly, 
ODI research has not yet unearthed anyone in the region 
who might want to implement such a scheme with South 
Africa. However, there is evidence that "regional processing" 
could become important in the near future. 
South Africa should also consider whether, by gaining GSP 
or ACP status, itwill damage the economies of the other 
countries now receiving these preferences. Those countries 
which already have any form of preferential access to the EC 
could lose whatever margin they now have over South Africa. 
South Africa's membership would, in principle, have to be 
approved by other ACP states, but the EC has been known 
to act unilaterally in the past. 
The countries that would be affected by preferences for 
South Africa include Chile, Argentine, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mauntius and Cote d'Ivoire, as 
well as some South East Asian countries. These are all fruit, 
vegetable and flower exporters. 
Clothing and textile exporters who would be affected 
included Zimbabwe, Maurinus and Kenya among the ACP 
countries, the North African countries with special access, 
the same L.atin American countries, China, some South East 
Asian countries and India. 
India is a particularly sensitive case because, despite its 
poverty and ex-colonial status, it has not been allowed into 
the ACP because it is considered too big. If South Africa, 
another large ex-colony, tried to join ACP, it could raise all 
sorts of sensitivities. It will, however, be very difficult for any 
country to make a case for South Africa being wildly out of 
line with other GSP countries. It is not in terms of income 
per capita nor in terms of its trading structure. 
SA may appear to have everything tc gain by seeking these 
preferences. But it could face a considerable loss in terms of 
antagonising other southern hemisphere countries by doing 
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so. It also has to seriously consider whether it wants to go the 
route of looking for preferences that fit in, on the 
manufacturing side, with the EC or US trade preferences. 
Or does South Africa want to follow the NIC route of having 
an industrial strategy and using any preference that came its 
way, but not particularly having those at the forefront of 
the way it planned its trade or international negotiating 
strategy? 
This is an important question because this is 1993 and not 
1973, when the UK joined the EC and brought with it the 
last major additions to the ACP, the ex-British colonies. 
Preferences are out of fashion this year, and are probably 
going to get more and more out of fashion. 
The EC is moving towards more reciprocity from the GSP 
countries and, in the negotiations on the Uruguay Round, 
the mood has been towards limiting the duration and extent 
of the preferences given to developing countries, and 
demanding more reciprocity. So it is possible that any 
preferences made avilable for South Africa will be of a limited 
durarion 
GATT BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT 
EC trade preferences and a 
post—apartheid South Africa 
CHRISTOPHER STEVENS. JANE KENNAN 
AND RICHARD KETLEY 
During the late 1980s the EC member states found themselves divided against each 
other over policy (notably on sanctions) towards the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. Will they find themselves equally divided over policy towards a post— 
apartheid regime in relation, this time, not to negative but to positive 
discrimination? As events unfold in South Africa most attention has been given, 
naturally eno,ih, to the redistribution of political and economic power between the 
main sections of society, but the international community must also consider how it 
should react f and when the domestic issues are resolved. 
This article is concerned with the trade policy that the EC should adopt when 
an acceptable government is installed in Pretoria. The choice is by no means 
clear—cut. South Africa's long isolation, its distorted economy, its uncertain 
prospects and its large size relative to its neighbours are all complicating factors. 
Moreover, the range of existing EC trade policies is so intricate that confusions 
and misunderstandings abound about the implications of the various options, 
both for South Africa and for third parties. As a major trade partner of all 
countries of Africa, the EC has a responsibility to ensure, at the least, that 
whatever actions it takes do not raise barriers between African states and, at 
best, that they facilitate the process of integration, albeit in a small way. 
In the nature of the case, much of the analysis is focused on the South African 
economy and its exports. But the decisions on trade regime will be taken by 
European ministers. It is with the implications—for South Africa and for third 
parties—of the options facing them that this article is concerned. 
Should South Africa receive preferences? 
This article examines three widely heard propositions to identify the evidence 
available to support or contradict them. They are, first, that South Africa 
should neither seek nor receive trade preferences; second, that if it does seek 
them, the best deal would be a tailor—made bilateral agreement with the EC; 
third, that if an off—the—peg package is selected, of those available the Lomé 
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Convention presents pecial difficulties that rule it out of further consideration. 
while the EC's trade regime with the Andean Pact countries presents a more 
appropriate model. 
The proposition that trade' preferences are not appropriate for South Africa 
has been voiced from two points of view: that the country does not need them. 
and that it does not merit them. One reason for arguing that South Africa 
should not seek preferences is that its future, even after the shift to a democratic 
regime. lies in the developed world. South Africa is classified as a developed 
country within GATT and, in order to encourage foreign investment, it should 
take no action suggesting that it is a developing country. There seems to be little 
of substance to support this view as developing country classification would 
involve few obvious negative consequences. may well be required to gain access 
to concessional funds, and clearly has not hindered the growth of. for example. 
the Asian industrializing countries. 
More cogently, it can be argued that, because of the commodity composition 
of its exports, South Africa would benefit much less from trade preferences than 
do many developing countries. Under the spur of sanctions and its natural 
resource base South Africa has developed exports of goods which are relatively 
lightly restricted in international trade and has a relatively broad geographical 
dispersion of markets. By definition, if there is no protectionism in major 
markets on a particular good, there is no scope for favoured exporters to be 
given preferences; and to the extent that any one market (such as the EC) has 
a small share of the total, the effects of each preference agreement will be muted. 
The counter—argument is that while only a relatively small proportion of 
South Africa's exports would benefit, there are sufficient goods that would do 
so for the pursuit of preferences to make sound commercial sense even though 
it would not 'solve' major economic problems. This is particularly true because 
South Africa faces serious discrimination on many of its agricultural exports, 
which are relatively labour—intensive and which, therefore, a post-apartheid 
government may wish to encourage. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the details of South Africa's exports 
(which successive governments have taken pains to obscure, to reduce 
vulnerability to sanctions) but it is possible to identify in broad terms the 
relative importance of exports on which preferences might be available.' Only 
half of South Africa's ten most important exports to the EC face most favoured 
nation (MFN) tariffs, and for some of these the tariffs are relatively light. 
Taking into account this concentration on lightly controlled products and the 
relative unimportance of the EC as a market, one estimate is that less than one— 
C 
fifth of South Africa's current exports would benefit substantially from 
preferences.2 However, preferences would be much more important for 
products which South Africa does export to the EC but which fall outside the 
Further guidance on the statistical pitfalls when analysing South African trade are available in Sheila 
Page and Christopher Stevens. T,adin with South .4frica: the policy options i'or the EC; 001 Special 
Report (London Overseas Development Institute. 1992). which also contains more details of some of 
the tigures cited in this article, ibid.. p. ix. 
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top ten. Fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, fish products and 
manufactures such as clothing and leather goods could benefit. 
Much has changed in world trade policy since South Africa slipped into 
isolation three decades ago. Two of the changes relevant to the present 
discussion are the growth of European protectionism on agriculture (under the 
CAP) and on labour—intensive manufactures, and, parallel to this, the 
construction of an intricate set of concessions on some products for some 
countries. These trends are not unconnected with the changing pattern of 
geographical trade evident from figures on total EC imports (i.e. the imports 
of member states from both within and without the Community). Comparing 
1990 with 1960, the share of developing countries as a whole in total EC 
imports has fallen from 26 per cent to 13 per cent, and that of the main 'MFN 
traders' (USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) from 20 per cent to 13 
per cent these falls reflect, in part, the growth of intra-EC trade. The EFTA and 
Mediterranean regions, by contrast, which have been principal beneficiaries of 
the EC's selective preferences, had much the same share of EC imports in 1990 
as in 1960 (9—to per cent for EFTA and 4 per cent for the Mediterranean). 
Although, as explained below, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group 
have on paper the most favourable trade regime for developing countries, it can 
be argued that the non—EC Mediterranean has the best combination of relatively 
generous trade preferences and substantial supply capacity. 
The result is that on many agricultural products South Africa trades at a 
disadvantage to its competitors even when sanctions are discounted. For 
example, South African exports of cut flowers to the EC pay a tariff of 20 per 
cent; those from Colombia enter duty free. In the case of grapes, EC imports 
from South Africa pay i8 per cent duty while from Turkey the rate is zero. 
These commercial barriers will remain even when sanctions have been 
removed. Moreover, the relative discrimination is likely to become more 
severe. There has been a tendency over recent years for European consumers to 
buy an increasingly exotic range of fruits and vegetables. Some of these carry 
much higher MFN tariffs than do the more traditional imports. Take the case 
of citrus fruits. Most varieties of orange pay an MFN tariff of only 4 per cent. 
Hence, while South Africa is at a relative disadvantage compared to Cyprus, 
which pays i per cent, this is not too severe. However, for mandarins, 
clementines and satsumas the MFN tariff is 20 per cent; Cyprus pays only 5.1 
per cent. Israel and Jordan 8 per cent and Turkey o per cent. Hence there is a 
powerful disincentive to South Africa diversifying its range of citrus exports. 
The available options 
A case can be made, therefore, that South Africa should seek some form of trade 
preference. but which? The EC has built up an exceedingly complex and 
opaque hierarchy of trade preferences over the past two decades. It is difficult 
to argue that poverty was ever the sole factor determining a developing 
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necessarily even a major factor. The principal bands in the hierarchy are 
presented in Figure r. The height of each band in the figure is scaled according 
to the share of the countries represented in each category in EC imports from 
all the states covered by the 'pyramid'. All of the preferential options are 
subject to review. The standard Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is in 
the process of being revised and its superior tranche ('Super GSP') is time- 
limited. The Lomé Convention provides the greatest certainty, but even it will 
expire at the end of the decade and may, or may not, be renewed. Nonetheless, 
it is unlikely that there will be major alterations to the hierarchy for the rest of 
this decade. Hence the present system probably represents accurately the range 
of options applicable to South Africa in the immediate post-apartheid period. 
At the apex of the hierarchy sits the Lomé Convention, which covers 
developing countries of a wide range of annual per capita incomes, from S38o 
(Zaire) to SII,293 (Bahamas).3 At the base is the GSP, which is the lowest 
common denominator of the EC's hierarchy. While it is available to almost all 
developing countries, it is of interest only to those that are not catered for more 
specifically through one of the higher—level schemes. Until recently the middle 
of the hierarchy was occupied by the Mediterranean states which have bilateral 
association agreements with the EC. But during the mid-198os the EC began 
to accord to countries on the UN's list of least developed states an improved 
C 
GSP which, on many commodities, provided access terms that were as 
favourable as those under the Lomé Convention. Then, in 1990, the 
Community agreed to extend this Super GSP on a temporary basis to four 
countries of the Andean Pact—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru—partly 
Here and below, income figures refer to real GDP per capita in 1989 purchasing power parity dollars. 
according to UNDP estimates. 
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Speed of negotiation ? ? * 
Depth of preferences ? ? ? 
Coverage of existing exports P P 
Coverage of future exports ? 
Compatibility with regional trade * ? ? 
as a result of US pressure to join in an anti—narcotics drive and partly because 
of Spanish desires to improve policies towards Latin America. Finally, in 1991, 
the EC accorded to the countries of Central America, again on a temporary 
basis, Super GSP treatment for their agricultural, but not their industrial, 
exports. 
In consequence of this ad hoc tinkering with the hierarchy to provide 
assistance where deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the day, there are 
numerous anomalies in which richer countries are accorded more favourable 
preferences than poorer ones. Colombia, for example, with an income of 
$4,068, is in the Super GSP tranche near the apex of the hierarchy, while India 
($9 io) is at the base. Turkey (S4,002) is in the Mediterranean tranche, while the 
Philippines (S2,269) is in the GSP. The Dominican Republic ($2,537) is now a 
member of the Lomé Convention, but Vietnam (Si,ooo) benefits only from the 
standard GSP. Some 29 states which have a human development index ranking 
(on UNDP definition) higher than South Africa receive trade preferences from 
the EC, and of these 17 are to be found in the upper levels of the 'pyramid of 
privilege 
South Africa's requirements 
Which of these four models—Lomé, Super GSP, bilateral association agreement 
and standard GSP—would provide the most appropriate solution to the trade 
problems of a post—apartheid South Africa? Table i provides a matrix that 
relates five of South Africa's requirements to the provisions of each of these 
models. An asterisk in a cell indicates that the model is particularly well suited 
to the requirement; a question mark indicates that the model responds 
adequately to South Africa's need; a blank means that the model is poorly 
suited to this requirement. 
A major requirement is that any trade deal be negotiated quickly. A post— 
apartheid government in South Africa will need to take positive steps to foster 
confidence in the international business and financial communities. A speedy 
agreement on the regime that will apply to trade with the EC will contribute 
to this process. By contrast, if there is a question mark over the status of South 
93 
'p 
Christopher Stei.'ens. Jane Kennan and Richard Ketley 
Africa in the European market for a period of time it will tend to make 
uncertainty worse. 
Of the four principal options, the GSP would probably be the quickest to 
approve and a tailor—made bilateral association agreement would be the slowest. 
The GSE is likely to be speedy both because it involves a relatively small degree 
of preference (and would tend, therefore, to provoke less resistance both inside 
and outside the EC) and because it is not negotiated. A major difference 
between the GSI and other trade policies with developing countries is that it 
is an autonomous act by the EC, which is normally presented as a take—it—or— 
leave—it offer. An association agreement, by contrast, may be expected to be the 
slowest to negotiate because it would be a one—off tailor—made agreement. in 
which each provision would have to be negotiated from scratch. 
The Super GSP and Lomé would seem to fall between the other two options. 
Being relatively deep preferences, they may provoke more opposition and 
contention, but being established packages they would avoid the need to go 
through all of South Africa's exports and potential exports commodity by 
commodity. Because it is at the apex of the pyramid Lomé may provoke the 
greater resistance of the two, particularly since, as explained below, a number 
of the more important provisions for South Africa would require special 
4 negotiation. 
A second South African requirement is that the preferences be as deep as 
possible. On this count the standard GSP is clearly the weakest option. All of 
the alternatives provide more substantial preferences. Many of South Africa's 
competitors on agricultural products benefit already from the Super GSP, an 
association agreement or the Lomé Convention. An EC decision to offer South 
Africa only standard GSP would reduce but not eliminate the relative 
disadvantage under which it currently trades. The depth of preferences has to 
be linked to the product coverage of the alternative schemes. Apart from the 
standard GSP, there is much similarity between the depth of preferences 
provided on those industrial and non—sensitive agricultural products that are 
covered (while on sensitive CAP commodities there is so much variation that 
it is hard to make a comparison between the schemes save on a product-by- 
product basis). Where the schemes differ most greatly is in their product 
coverage. 
In Table 2 the coverage of the Lomé Convention, a typical Mediterranean 
agreement, Super GSP and standard GSP are plotted against South Africa's 
twenty most important export commodities which face greater than zero MFN 
C 
tariffs in the EC. In most cases this information is presented at the greatest level 
of trade disaggregation as EC tariffs vary markedly between some eight-digit 
items within a particular commodity group: in some cases, however, it has been 
possible to aggregate items. It is clear that the Lomé Convention and a 
Mediterranean—style agreement cover the bulk of South Africa's most important 
exports, while the Super GSP (even in its Andean Pact form, which covers both 
agricultural and industrial products) and the standard GSP have much poorer 
coverage. As noted, South Africa has a relatively small proportion of products 
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which face serious MFN tariffs in the EC market, but there are sufficient 
exceptions to make a preference arrangement worthwhile. The total value or 
South Africa's exports to the EC in 1990 of the products listed in Table 2 wa 
over ecu r. billion. 
It is also clear from the table that the depth of the preferences is greater for 
the Lom Convention and Mediterranean-style agreements than for the others. 
but that neither covers all products. One major item that is included under a 
typical Mediterranean agreement but not under Lom is grapes. Another 
difference is that while apples and pears are covered under Lorné they are 
constrained by a very small quota of I,ooo tonnes for each. In fact. ACP exports 
in 1990 (at 1,751 tonnes) exceeded the quota for apples and (at 821 torlnes) 
absorbed the greater part of that for pears. Provision exists within the Lomé 
Convention for these quotas to be increased through negotiation. This could 
happen either as part of the talks concerning enlargement of the ACP to include 
South Africa, or during the 'mid-term review' of Lomé IV in 1995. There 
also exists provision for the range of sensitive agricultural commodities to be 
extended under Article 168(2)(b), for example to grapes. There is rio reason to 
suppose that the negotiations on sensitive agricultural products would be more 
or less difficult within the framework of the Lomé Convention than under a 
bespoke Mediterranean—style agreement. 
By contrast, Lomé's coverage extends to coal, a significant South African 
export. There are also substantial preferences on clothing/textiles. At present, 
given the apparently uncompetitive nature of much of the South African 
industry, these are of only hypothetical interest. However, as a post—apartheid 
government may foster diversification into clothing exports as part of an 
employment—creating strategy, it is worth noting that the Lomé regime is 
unique among the EC's preference agreements in this respect. Not only are 
ACP states at present exempt from formal controls on exports of originating 
clothing/textiles (although there have been a few 'voluntary' export restraints), 
but the Lomé Convention specifically rules out control along the lines of the 
Multifibre Arrangement (subject to an underlying 'safeguard clause' that 
applies to the whole Convention and has never been used). Article 169(1) states 
unequivocally that 'The Community shall not apply to imports of products 
originating in the ACP States any quantitative restrictions or measures having 
equivalent effect'; the sole exceptions to this provision are some CAP products. 
Given the uncertainty over the nature of South Africa's future exports, 
illustrated by clothing/textiles, it is important that any agreement reached with 
the EC is sufficiently flexible to provide preferences on goods that the country 
may export competitively in the future, even though it does not do so now. 
C The fourth line in Table 1, therefore, plots the four options in terms of their coverage of potential future exports. Only the Lomé Convention has complete 
There is also provision for negotiations on two products that South Africa does not export to the EC 
because the import barriers are too high, but might be able to export with preferences: sugar and 
beef. However, these are such sensitive commodities that it appears most unlikely that South Africa 
could negotiate concessions under any regime. 
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flexibility, at least for manufactured goods, with its commitment to offer 
unrestricted access to all industrial products meeting the rules of origin. None 
of the agreements provides major flexibility for sensitive agricultural products, 
although here again the Lomé Convention tends to be the most flexible. 
Potential support for regional cooperation 
The regional impact in Southern Africa of EC policy is of particular concern 
given the Community's obligations to the region under the Lomé Convention 
and South Africa's need to normalize relations with its neighbours. The 
question of the effect of these alternative preference schemes on the competitive 
position of the Southern African states needs to be considered in the broader 
context of the trade impact on all developing countries, which is the subject of 
the next section. However, an additional consideration is that the EC should 
avoid erecting artificial barriers between the Southern African states and, 
indeed, should if at all possible adopt an arrangement that encourages trade 
between them. 
The Lom Convention has unique advantages in this area, in particular its 
provisions on what is known as 'regional cumulation'. This would encourage 
countries in the region to collaborate in producing goods for eventual export 
to the EC. All trade preference schemes incorporate rules of origin to determine 
where a good was produced and, therefore, whether it is eligible for 
preferences. These are frequently contentious. One of the criticisms levelled at 
EC schemes is that the rules are unduly onerous, so that poor countries are 
unable to take advantage in practice of preferences that appear on paper to be 
generous. The Lomé Convention's origin rules are more favourable than those 
in other agreements in several respects. In the context of intra—regional trade the 
most important is that they include particularly liberal provisions on 'regional 
cumulation'. These allow two or more ACP/EC states to undertake different 
parts of the production of a good so that when these processes are aggregated 
the finished product meets the Lomé rules of origin even though the amount 
of working in any of these states individually is insufficient to enable it to do so. 
For example, the rules of origin on fish caught in the high seas are 
particularly severe. Fish exported from Angola, for example, receives Lomé 
preferences only if it is caught from boats that are accepted by the EC as 
Angolan or belonging to another Lomé state (whether ACP or EC). To be an 
'Angolan' boat a vessel must be registered or recorded in Angola, sail under the 
Angolan flag, be at least so per cent owned by Angolan nationals or by a 
company with its head office in Angola with Angolan management, and be 
sailed by a crew at least half of whom are Angolan citizens. For countries 
without a maritime tradition these rules are extremely difficult to meet, as they 
are for poor countries given the high capital cost of modern fishing boats. But 
under the cumulation provisions of the Lomé rules of origin it is possible for 
these criteria to be fulfilled by capital and personnel drawn from more than one 
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Convention there would be scope for cooperation between the country's 
fishing fleet and other ACP states that have difficulty meeting the rules of 
origin. 
Another example is provided by woven clothing. Under the Lorné origin 
rules, exports of woven clothing receive preferences only if they are from cloth 
produced within the EC/ACP group; the only non-originating imported raw 
material that is allowed is yarn. This has hindered ACP exports of woven (as 
opposed to knitted) clothing.5 If South Africa were in the Lomé Convention 
its textile industry (assuming that it becomes internationally competitive) could 
supply inputs to the clothing firms of other ACP states. 
South African membership of the Lomé Convention might foster 
intraregional trade; would one of the other options erect barriers to such trade? 
No Mediterranean-style agreement provides an option for cumulation with 
other bilaterally associated states. Of course, the EC is not bound to follow 
slavishly an existing model; it could agree to special rules permitting 
cumulation between South Africa and its neighbours. But this seems an unlikely 
and difficult process as such rules (which are likely to be detailed and technical) 
would have to be drafted from scratch. There do exist provisions under the GSP 
and Super GSP for regional cumulation, but these are less satisfactory than those 
under Lomé in two important respects. First, Lomé is unique among the EC's 
4 trade agreements with developing countries in allowing both EC and 
t beneficiary states (in this case the ACP) to participate in cumulation. Under the 
GSP it is only possible to have cumulation between developing countries, 
which must also apply the same rules of origin to trade among themselves of 
the goods in question, a requirement that so far only ASEAN has been able to 
fulfil. Second, and more importantly, under the GSP rules each collaborating 
country must export to its neighbour a good that fulfils the rules of origin. It 
is not possible, for example, for Botswana to export to South Africa a good that 
half meets the rules of origin for it to be finished in South Africa—the 
Botswanan exports would have to fulfil the rules of origin fully before they 
could be classified as a Botswanan good for cumulation purposes. 
Implications for other developing countries 
A post-apartheid South Africa inside the Lomé Convention could supply 
material to the clothing industries of other ACP states; but would this displace 
existing or potential exports from Zimbabwe? More broadly, which 
developing countries would be adversely affected by the extension of 
C preferences to South Africa, and would the range of affected states and commodities differ between the alternative preference schemes? As noted 
above, a number of South Africa's most important exports currently face MFN 
tariffs that are either zero or very low, limiting both the potential gains to the 
country from preferences and, by the same token, the potential costs to other 
Matthew McQueen and Chnstopher Stevens. 'Trade preferences and Lonié IV: non-traditional ACP 
exports to the EC'. Development Policy Review. 7 (1989). pp. 239—60. 
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trading parties. However, there remain a significant number of commodities in 
which South Africa currently faces discrimination compared with most of its 
competitors. 
General ejiects 
It is an inherent characteristic of selective trade preferences that their extension 
to new exporting states may reduce their value to existing beneficiaries. Any 
extension of preferences to South Africa will reduce the level of advantage 
currently enjoyed by its competitors, while elevation to the upper tranches of 
the pyramid of privilege could give South Africa an advantage over some. As 
a broad rule of thumb it may be assumed that the greater the number of 
products on which discrimination against South Africa is removed, the greater 
the likelihood of increased competition for third parties. Those third parties 
most seriously affected will be the ones which export a large number of 
competitive products and/or which currently benefit from particularly deep 
preferences over South Africa. 
Table 3 presents a list of the commodities which are significant South African 
exports and in which competition with other developing countries appears 
most likely, together with the states involved. The commodities are those 
which are currently exported by South Africa to the EC and on which it faces 
discrimination compared with some developing country suppliers. There are 
eighteen such commodities, many of them CAP products. The table does not 
take account of potential future exports. A number of very large mineral 
beneficiation projects are either under way or at a final decision stage. The 
changes to economic policy that may be expected post-apartheid may result in 
new competitive exports. Given the distortions and secrecy engendered by 
sanctions, identifying current exports is a contentious exercise; forecasting 
future exports is even more problematic. Fortunately it is not an essential 
exercise for determining the most appropriate trade regime after apartheid, save 
to argue that it should be as flexible as possible. As noted above, all of the trade 
options are of relatively short duration. Lomé IV expires at the end of the 
decade (before any substantial beneficiated mineral exports will come on 
stream), while the existing Super GSP arrangements are of four years' duration. 
Hence, although some new exports may have emerged and some traditionals 
may have grown, there is unlikely to be any substantial change in the pattern 
of South Africa's exports before the EC has the opportunity to renegotiate any 
deal agreed in the near future. 
For each commodity listed, Table 3 identifies South Africa's principal 
developing country competitors in the EC and the regimes under which most 
EC imports from developing countries take place. In three cases—uncoated 
kraft, seat parts and iron bars and rods—all of South Africa's developing 
country competitors trade on GSP terms, which are as liberal as those available 
under any of the other preferential regimes. Hence, the only choice is whether 
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present system of discrimination. In the other fifteen cases there is a range of 
preferential accords such that if South Africa is granted low—level preferences 
some of its competitors will still enjoy a comparative advantage, while if it is 
given an upper-tranche regime other competitors (indicated in the table by 
italics) will be disadvantaged. The number of products in which.South Africa 
would have an advantage over some of its competitors varies according to the 
regime it is accorded. The number is seven if it were granted Super GSP 
treatment, twelve if it had an association agreement, and fourteen if it were a 
member of the Lomé Convention. 
As the Lomé Convention and an Andean Pact-style Super GSP have been 
suggested as the principal alternatives, it is helpful to identify the main 
differences in terms of potential competition. There are seven products in which 
there is a difference between the potential impact on third parties of Super GSP 
and Lomé treatment for South Africa. They are coal, fresh apples, citrus fruit, 
pears, avocados, ferro—silicon manganese and pineapple juice. The countries that 
would be affected (in the sense that they would trade on similar terms if South 
Africa had Super GSP but would be at a disadvantage with Lomé) are 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile (which would be affected on three products), 
Thailand (two products) and Colombia, China, Israel, Mexico, Philippines and 
Uruguay (one product each). 
The extent to which the change in competitive positions will feed through 
into a loss of export revenue for South Africa's competitors is difficult to predict 
because most of the problem commodities face regulated markets in the EC. In 
the case of fresh deciduous fruit, for example, the CAP operates a system of 
minimum import prices which limits the scope for South Africa to increase its 
market share by undercutting its rivals. In the case of minerals, trade is 
controlled by a small number of companies, many of which have interests in 
several exporting countries. Exports of textiles from all the countries listed in 
Table 3 as competing with South Africa on this product are subject to quotas 
either inside or outside the Multifibre Arrangement. And in the case of fish, the 
onerous rules of origin noted above have prevented some of the countries listed 
in the table taking full advantage of the preferences notionally on offer. 
Effects on the ACP and Southern Africa 
The potential negative consequences for ACP states, and especially South 
Africa's neighbours in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), are of particular concern, not least because South Africa will have to 
win the support of the ACP if it is to succeed in any application to join Lomé. 
The pros and cons of three of the preferential options for SADC are plotted in 
Table 4. This covers the GSP, the Super GSP and the Lomé Convention. A 
Mediterranean—style association agreement has not been included on the 
assumption that it is ruled out of contention by the likely onerous negotiating 
process, the absence of regional cumulation provisions and the fact that it is not 
obviously superior for South Africa to the Lomé Convention. Each of these 
I0I 
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Table 4. Pros and cons for SADC 
Super 
GSP GSP Lomé 
Competition * 
Involvement in negotiations — ? 
Support for regional trade ? ? 
Aid contracts — — * 
Political cooperation — — * 
three options is considered in terms of the likely competition that will result for 
SADC countries, their involvement in the negotiations to ensure that their 
interests are taken into account, the suppon that the regimes will give for 
regional trade, the possibilities that will result for aid contracts within the 
region and the extent to which the trade preferences will support political co- 
operation. An asterisk indicates a positive correlation between the scheme and 
SADC's interests; a question mark denotes that it may be possible to satisfy 
SADC's interests; a dash means that the trade option is relatively poorly related 
to SA1)C's interests. 
Clearly, standard GSP will result in less competition for South Africa's 
neighbours than will the other options. On most of the other criteria, however, 
the Loin Convention provides a more attractive alternative. If South Africa 
attempts to negotiate membership of the Lomé Convention all of the ACP 
states vill be de jure parties to the negotiations. If, by contrast, the EC accords 
South Africa standard GSP treatment there is unlikely to be any significant 
formal, and very limited informal, involvement of the ACP states. The EC does 
'consult' the ACP on extensions to the GSP but such 'consultations' have 
always been extremely perfunctory. It is possible that more serious consultation 
would occur if Super GSP were under consideration. As this is a restricted form 
of agreement the EC might wish to take fuller note of the views of other 
developing countries, including the ACP. However, as the GSP is an 
autonomous act by the EC no other parties (including South Africa) would 
have any formal role in negotiations; indeed, there would be no 'negotiations' 
in the full sense of the term. It is noteworthy that the ACP did raise objections 
to the provision of Super GSP treatment to the Andean Pact countries but failed 
to influence the EC's decision. 
In addition to its provisions for regional cumulation noted above, the Lomé 
C 
Convention would provide a tangible support for regional trade as all ACP 
states may tender for aid contracts finance under the Convention. As there are 
no aid provisions for either the GSP or the Super GSP, this possibility does not 
arise. Similarly, the absence of any political dimension to the GSP and Super 
GSP rules out the possibilities that exist under Lomé for fostering political 
cooperation among the parties. 
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Alternatives to preferences 
Trade preferences will have a modest impact and may affect adversely other 
developing countries (albeit in a similarly restricted fashion). Are there other 
ways in which the EC can provide the limited assistance available to it that are 
economically or politically superior? The most obvious instrument for 
comparison is financial aid. Would it be politically easier and less damaging to 
the multilateral trade system for the EC simply to provide more aid instead of 
trade preferences? And would the impact on South Africa be the same? 
The link between trade and aid is particularly germane because of the nature 
of the product markets in which preferences would be most valuable to South 
Africa in the short term. The objective of trade protection is artificially to 
restrict supply on the protected market and thus raise the price. If they do not 
result in a significant increase in supply, selective trade preferences tend to 
confer on the beneficiaries part of the economic rent that results from this 
artificial restriction. This is particularly true in the case of South Africa's exports 
falling within the purview of the CAP. EC imports of deciduous fruits, for 
example, are subject to 'minimum import prices': that is, the exporter must not 
sell below a predetermined price or else the EC imposes a levy to ensure that 
the minimum is respected. Even countries that receive preferences in the form 
of full or partial reductions in tariffs have to respect the minimum import price. 
It does not follow, therefore, that the extension of tariff-cutting preferences to 
South Africa would result in any fall in the price of its exports on the EC market 
(or, indeed, in any increased competition for market share with other suppliers). 
The EC market price of South African exports would fall only if it were 
currently above the minimum and the exporter's strategy were to increase 
market share by cutting prices. 
It is perfectly possible, therefore, that trade preferences would result 
primarily in South African exporters retaining a larger share of the final value 
of their exports rather than an increase in volume of sales. In 1990, for example, 
South African exports to the EC of deciduous fruits paid customs dues ofR4I.6 
million (ecu 13 million). The full or partial reduction of EC import tariffs 
would result in a transfer from the EC budget (which would receive lower 
import duties) to South African exporters. 
If the net effect of trade preferences is a static transfer of revenue from the EC 
budget to South Africa rather than a dynamic growth in trade, why not handle 
the whole thing as aid? There are two factors to consider. The first is that the 
impact in South Africa of the two measures is likely to be different. Despite the 
use of non-governmental organizations and efforts to involve the private sector, 
aid remains heavily a government-to-government affair. An increase in EC aid 
would tend to swell the revenue of the South African government; trade 
preferences (unless offset by South African export taxes) would tend to increase 
the revenue of exporters. 
The second, perhaps more immediately practical, difference between the two 
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preferences is often larger than can be obtained from aid. It is not sensible tc 
attempt a quantification of Lorné—stvle trade preferences; given the largt 
uncertainties over the scale of present exports and the competitiveness of Souft 
African producers the results would almost certainly be spurious. Moreover. 
the volume of aid that So.uth Africa might receive is also imponderable. 
especially as the comparison is between revenue from trade preferences and the 
amount of additional aid that might be obtained by forgoing them, rather than 
the total amount of aid. Nonetheless, it may be helpful to provide some 
illustrative figures of the possible scale of flows. 
South Africa is at present a particularly favoured beneficiary of EC aid. There 
is a special line in the EC budget for the Community's Special Programme for 
Victims of Apartheid which was established within the framework of European 
Political Cooperation in September 1985. The aid is intended for positive 
measures' in support of multiracial development and has increased rapidly so 
that by 1992 It was running at ecu 8o million per year. This makes South Africa 
the largest recipient of EC aid in Africa. It is most unlikely that the country vilI 
be such a favoured recipient after the change to an internationally acceptable 
regime. Aid within the Lomé Convention is divided between countries 
according to an undisclosed formula that takes account both of population and 
of development level, and tends to favour smaller, less developed countries. A 
point of comparison is Zimbabwe, which has a national aid programme under 
Lomé IV of ecu 88 million. If this is adjusted for the difference in population 
size of the two countries it implies a potential aid allocation for South Africa 
of around ecu 300 million, or ecu óo million per year. But South Africa must 
expect to receive less per capita because of its size and relative wealth. The 
allocation in Lomé IV for Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is only ecu 
260 million for the five years (or ecu 52 million per year). It is unlikely that the 
country could achieve a larger aid budget under any of the alternative 
arrangements to Lomé membership. 
If the total annual EC aid allocation to South Africa is in the broad range of 
ecu o million, the potential gains of ecu 13 million for the deciduous fruit 
industry appear quite respectable. South African negotiators would have to 
achieve an increase in their aid allocation of about one-quarter (and maintain 
this premium every year) in return for forgoing trade preferences simply to 
cover the additional revenue that could be earned by one economic subsector. 
Add in the less easily quantifiable static gains by other sectors and even modest 
dynamic gains and it becomes clear that even if preferences have only static 
effects aid is unlikely to reach the volumes necessary for it to be an acceptable 
alternative, as opposed to an appropriate additional support. 
The negotiating procedures 
While South Africa presents the EC with particular problems (because of its size 
and undoubted competitive strengths in some areas), there are plenty of 
precedents for admitting new members to existing arrangements, and for 
104 
The EC and post—apartheid South Africa 
extending deep preferences to middle-income states. The procedures concerned 
with the Lomé Convention are the most formalized. 
The first Lomé Convention was signed by 44 ACP states in 1975; there are 
now 69 signatories. Most of the new entrants were small, newly independent 
states that could be absorbed without major difficulty. But there have been 
some 'difficult cases'. Both the EC and ACP assumed that Zimbabwe would 
join following the transition to majority rule, but its size and competitiveness 
made the negotiations difficult. Angola and Mozambique declined to join at 
first and their relations with the EC were troubled during the period they were 
outside. EC regional aid in Southern Africa faced particular disruption while 
Angola and Mozambique drew their assistance from a different budget, a point 
to be noted by SADC and South Africa. Most recently, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic were admitted to Lomé IV even though they had not 
been recent colonies of an EC member state and were not integrated into one 
of the main regional organizations such as the Organization for African Unity 
or Caricom. In an effort to ensure that the accession of Haiti and, especially, the 
Dominican Republic could not be used as a precedent for other Latin American 
countries, the text of Lomé IV contains wording to the effect that South Africa 
is eligible for membership under normal geographical criteria. Annex I of 
Lomé IV confirms that 'the geographical area of the Convention must remain 
restricted to the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific'. 
The principal legal (as opposed to political) grounds on which South African 
membership could be denied relate to the structure of its economy rather than 
its geographical location. The criteria and procedures for enlarging the parties 
to Lomé IV are covered by articles 356—63. Article 363(I) refers to a 'request 
for accession to this Convention submitted by a State whose economic structure 
and production are comparable with those of the ACP States' (emphasis added). If 
such a state applies for membership the application must be approved by the 
EC—ACP Council of Ministers. The article also raises the possibility that not all 
of the rights and obligations associated with membership need be made 
available at the same time. Any especially difficult parts of South Africa's 
application (such as a claim for access to the Stabex fund for commodity 
earnings stabilization) could therefore be deferred if the parties so decided. 
There seem to be three salient features of the situation. First, South Africa 
must apply. Lomé IV contains the unusual precedent of previewing the 
membership of Namibia, the independence of which occurred after the 
Convention was signed, but the normal position is that a state wishing to join 
Lomé must take the initiative. Second, if South Africa were to apply a decision 
would be taken jointly by the EC ant! the ACP. This analysis has suggested that 
there are some sound commercial reasons why the ACP might welcome a 
South African application, but there are also many fears in Africa that the 
country is too competitive, too large and too politically dominant for comfort. 
This article has not considered the impact of the preferential alternatives on 
producers in the EC. However, this has been studied elsewhere and the results 
suggest that while the level of potential competition from Lomé membership 
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is small in absolute terms it is also sufficiently large to provoke howls of anguish 
from producer interests in a wide range of EC states.6 The third conclusion, 
therefore, is that South Africa has a major political task in persuading the ACP 
and then the EC to accept its application. 
Implications for the EC 
This article has dealt only with the trade relationship between the EC and a 
post—apartheid South Africa; it has referred to aid and political links only in 
passing. But the Lomé Convention has strong aid and institutional cooperation 
dimensions; association agreements typically contain a financial protocol; and 
aid is available to GSP and Super GSP beneficiaries under the non—associates and 
food aid programmes. Clearly, these non—trade factors have to be taken into 
account. But it is the decisions on trade that are likely tt cause the greatest 
divisions within the EC. Member states not satisfied with the level of 
Community aid can always use their bilateral programmes to make good any 
shortfall, but all states will have to live with whatever is agreed on trade. 
It is clear that trade preferences are not central to the solution of South 
Africa's economic problems; they are, at best, a helpful adjunct to the domestic, 
economic and political reforms required to remove the major distortions. This 
would be true even if a substantial proportion of the country's exports faced 
heavy protective barriers and was concentrated on the European market. The 
fundamental justification for South Africa to seek preferences must be that its 
economic problems are so great that it should not overlook any avenue of 
support (especially one that would benefit in particular labour—intensive 
production). From an EC perspective, trade preferences are one of only a very 
few ways in which assistance can be given and will probably be additional, 
rather than an alternative, to other forms of assistance. 
Previous intra—EC negotiations on extending preferences indicate that the 
subject is a contentious one. EC Commission attempts during the Lomé III and 
IV negotiations to extend preferences on sensitive agricultural products, for 
example, won support from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany, but foundered on opposition from the Mediterranean states. An 
analysis of the South African exports that would benefit from the preference 
options suggests that there are no major EC interests at stake.7 But there is a 
range of minor concerns which, on past form, will be sufficient to provoke 
resistance to deep preferences from some member states. Even though most of 
South Africa's fruits would continue to face minimum import prices under any 
regime, for example, France, Italy and Spain may feel threatened. 
C 
In consequence, the negotiation of useful trade preferences is likely to be 
tough. Deep trade preferences are desirable for South Africa, but they are by 
no means assured. Standard GSP treatment would be easier to achieve but 
would provide few benefits to South Africa. As the EC and South Africa face 
a political battle to achieve Lomé membership, would they not be well advised 
Page and Stevens. Trading with South Africa'. 1 ibid., table i. 
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to seek one of the other options? The precedent of the Super GSP for the 
Andean Pact countries has been specifically put forward.8 
The analysis in this article suggests that there are no major, objective grounds 
for arguing that either Super GSP or an association agreement present fewer 
trade challenges to the EC, to the ACP or to other developing countries. On 
the contrary, the ACP would be better served in the trade area by South 
Africa being accepted into the ACP than by its being accorded Super GSP 
treatment (although the position for Latin America is probably the reverse). On 
almost all of the products in which South Africa currently competes with the 
ACP the provisions of the Super GSP or a typical association agreement are as 
generous as those under Lomé. And, in the case of Lomé, the potential costs of 
increased competition for the ACP can be set against the advantages that they 
will be involved directly in the accession negotiations and that the Convention 
may provide some stimulus to intra-Southem African trade. With the Super 
GSP and an association agreement there are no such offsetting gains. 
For Latin American and Asian countries that benefit only from the standard 
GSP any deep preference may result in potential competition. There are a 
number of products, such as fresh apples, pears and pineapple juice, in which 
neither Super GSP nor an association agreement provides deep preferences but 
which are covered by Lomé. Hence, the Lomé Convention would be the worst 
of the three, but the differences between them are not great. The three countries 
most 'at risk' appear to be Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
For the EC the major potential trade problem of the Lomé Convention, as 
opposed to the other deep preference options, is its all—embracing nature, It 
might appear at first sight that the EC would have more control through the 
Super GSP or an association agreement in tailoring preferences to protect either 
European or other developing country interests. In fact, however, this is 
unlikely to be the case in the short term. On many of the products of most 
interest to South Africa the Lomé Convention does not provide carte blanche. 
Rather, there are specific quotas or other restrictions and it would be necessary 
to negotiate special provisions for South Africa even within the context of its 
membership of the Convention. 
In the final analysis, political considerations are likely to weigh more than 
economic factors in determining the trade regime that will apply between the 
EC and a post-apartheid South Africa. Although the final decision will be taken 
by the EC, the next step lies with South Africa. The country needs to present 
its case with as much force and skill as possible. Its chances of success are likely 
to be greater if a decision of principle on the type of regime to apply can be 
taken before the domestic issues are fully resolved and 'the South Africa dossier' 
moves off the desks of foreign ministers and heads of government in Europe and 
into the in—trays of agriculture and industry ministers. If Lomé membership is 
the objective, South Africa must take the initiative both to seek the support of 
Not least in a presentation by Dr Volkmar Köhler MP, former German Minister of Development 
Cooperation. to the conference on A changing South Africa convened by the R11A and the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (June i99). 
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the ACP group and formally to apply. The ANC has been reluctant to take, 
step that could be misinterpreted as suggesting a normalization of econoi 
relations with the apartheid regime. It is important to note, therefore, that th 
are precedents from Zimbabwe and Namibia for entering into infori 
discussions with the EC well in advance of any transfer of power. The A' 
might consider whether to take advantage of the window of opportunity 
now exists to begin a dialogue with the ACP and the EC on the basis tha 
there is a satisfactory political change in South Africa, then the country wo 
seek Lomé membership. 
io8 
_____ - 
EC-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS; FROM PARIAH TO PARTNER? 
South African Institute of International Affairs, 
BP Centre, Cape Town, 13 October 1993. 
Martin Holland 
Alexander von Humboldt fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 
Freiburg, Gernany. 
When I received the invitation to talk to the SAIIA on the 
topic of European Community relations With South Africa, my 
immediate response was to ask "why should there be a 
relationship"? This thought was provoked by an article 
written by a well-known southern African academic 
commentator, Christopher Coker, writing in the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs journal, International 
Affairs in 1991. Coker argued strongly that southern Africa 
in general will cease to be of any significant policy 
relevance for the West by the end of this century. To 
paraphrase, without apartheid as the rallying call, the 
region and South Africa itself, looses its significance 
economically, strategically and morally. Simply, the 
realization of non-racial democracy signifies the end of the 
problem for the European Community. From pariah to oblivion. 
Such an interpretation cannot be dismissed entirely, 
particularly as the EC has beconie preoccupied with political 
and economic issues somewhat closer to home — the 
reunification of Germany, east European democratization and 
market economies, the war in the former Yugoslavia. However, 
I do not agree with Coker's pessimism. In the remainder of 
this talk I will attempt to demonstrate that the European 
Community has not only maintained an interest in South and 
southern Africa, since the middle of 1993 this interest has 
been given an increased commitment. The 1990s have witnessed 
the transition in EC relations from South Africa as "pariah" 
to South Africa as "partner". Nor do you necessarily have to 
take my word alone. Sir Leon Brittan, Vice—President of the 
European Commission and Commissioner responsible for external 
economic relations (including those with South Africa) made 
the following comments in June of this year: 
Is the EC, or the Us or, the West in general now 
turning Eastwards, to the detriment of North/South 
cooperation? Is the African continent as a whole on 
its way to being forgotten? And once multi—party 
democracy has been achieved, will queEtions be 
asked as to why we should help a relatively rich 
country like South Africa, once the moral 
imperative of dismantling apartheid is no longer 
there? 
The message from the EC on this point is clear; we 
have been in the forefront to assist South Africa, 
and we will continue to do so throughout its 
difficult transition and beyond. 
Political rhetoric je, Qf course, relatively inexpensive, 
even in the European Community. However, the views of the 
Commission have been reinforced by two separate documents: 
the Development Council guidelines; and the June 1993 EPC 
statement on future relations with South Africa. 
To appreciate fully the changed nature of Community relations 
with South Africa, it is necessary to remjnd ourselves of the 
"abnormal" relations that existed from 1977—91. In fact, the 
EC has never had "normal" relations with the Republic. In 
1977 the first exclusively EC policy vis-à-vis South Africa, 
the "Code of Conduct for EC firms with subsidiaries operating 
in South Africa" was introduced. It was designed to improve 
representation and remuneration levels for black workers and 
negate the workplace effects of apartheid ]egis1ation. The 
Code was modified once, in 1985, but continued as part of EC 
policy until June of this year when it was announced that the 
formal reporting required under the Code would be abolished. 
The negative sanctions adopted in 1985—86 effected trade, 
scientific, military , cultural and sporting relations. For 
example: 
a) the export of Krugerrands was prohibited; 
b) imports of certain iron and steel products were banned; 
c) a voluntary ban on new investments was imposed; 
d) military attaches were withdrawn and military, nuclear and 
technological collaboration halted. (Holland, 1988) 
In addition, the EC introduced what it deemed "ppsitive" 
measures in the orni of assistance through the "Special 
Programme for the victims of apartheid". By 1993 all the EC 
sanctions had been removed and the Code abolished: in 
contrast, the positive measures remain in place and have been 
expanded, asl will describe to you in one monent. 
Within the context of these sanctions, other aspects of trade 
were maintained with the Community; for example, whereas in 
1984 the last year before sanctions, the EC collectively 
imported 8,825m Ecu worth of South African goods, four years 
later this had climbed to 12,515m Ecu. Nonetheless, the 
relationship was abnormal politically and punctuated with 
periodic diplomatic declarations by the Community denouncing 
some aspect of South African Government policy. In fact, from 
the mid-1980s through to 1990, the EC issued more demarchés 
on South Africa than for any other international topic! 
What then might a "normal" EC—South African relationship look 
like? Current Community thinking on this issue can be broken hr 
down into e basic elements. I use the word "thirki.ng" 
advisably: Community policy is still emerging and will 
respond to events. The Community position I am outlining 
reflects the "best outcome" scenario. Clearly if the election 
process is jeopardized, the Community's attitude will change 
accordingly. The three basic elements that are apparent are: 
1) Overall development policy and the new Special Programme 
and involvement in the election process; 
2) the institutional representation of the EC in South Africa 
(via the Observer group, Coordination Office and by 1994 an 
EC Commission Delegation); and, 
3) the shape of the new relationship: its regional and trade 
consequences and the question of Lomé. 
Let me briefly outline the Community's views oi each of these 
questions (see Commission, 1993 for further details). 
1) Development Policy and the new Special Droaramme. 
When the EC's Special Programme was first introduced in 1985 
it was allocated lOm Ecu (R38m) for legal aid, humanitarian 
and social projects and education and training. It was at the 
time an explicitly political initiative and provoked the 
South African Government into considering curbing external 
funding of anti-apartheid groups. The new Programme has been 
in place since 1991 and is much broader in its scope and has 
received significant annual funding increases each year, a 
significant indication of the EC's strong commitment to 
development issues in South Africa. By 1993 90m Ecu (R34lm) 
per annum was allocated for development projects. This makes 
the Special Programme the EC's largest single programmable 
development initiative in Africa. The EC is also the largest 
international donor of external assistance to South Africa: 
the figures for 1992 show the EC the leading donor with SOin 
Ecu (R303m) compared with 601n Ecu for the USA (R228) and 4Ozn 
Ecu for Sweden (R].52). Bilateral European assistance from the 
UK, Germany, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands added almost 
a further 6Oin Ecu (R220). Under the Special Programme between 
1986—92 536 separate projects have been sponsored at a 
cumulative cost of over 259m Ecu (R95O. This level of 
commitment will be maintained, if not increased, in 1994. 
Theobjectives of the new Special Programme are to establish 
a coherent ector-based coordinated development proqramme 
that wil1 be sustainable in the long term and lead to a 
consensus on the nature of South Africa's development 
problems. The Programme is involved in five distinct areas: 
- education artd training (the largest sector with 83m Ecu 
(R315xn) committed 1991—93); 
— rural and agricultural development (36m Ecu (R136m); 
- good governance and democratization (131n Ecu (R50m)); 
— health (7.7rn Ecu (R29m)); and, 
- community development (7.2m Ecu (R27m)). 
Briefly, here are some examples of the types of projects 
covered under these categories. 
Education and training takes approximately 45% of C funds. 
While the programme covers education from the pre-primary 
level upwards, the bulk of funds are devoted to tertiary 
support. In 1993 the EC has provided 7,000 black students 
with bursaries (worth some 20m Ecu — R75m). Rural and 
agricultural development supports local micro-projects such 
as the supply of water and sanitation and is responsive to 
the development as determined by individual local 
communities. Funds allocated for good governance and 
democratization are devoted to issues such as conflict 
resolution, human rights and the viability of a pluralistic 
print media. A major aspect of the health programme is 
funding for preventative primary health care. And assistance 
for community development concentrates or homeless youths and 
general urban and community renewal projects. 
Obviously the sums involved are by themselves inadequate. 
However, the purpose of Community funding is to establish a 
development framewOrk that will lend itself to long term 
development. In that sense 'EC involvement is instrumental and 
significant. 
An additional area covered by the EC's democratization 
programme is the election process. This has become an area of 
concerted EC activity during 1993-94. The EC has committed 
funds to voter education projects, registration programmes 
and the training of election monitors. The EC will make a 
igiificant contribution to the international election 
monitoring team in April 1994. 
2..The institutional representation of the EC in South Africa 
Obviously during the "abnormal" phase of relations the EC 
excluded any direct links, at least within South Africa. 
Interestingly, the South African mission attached to the EC 
in Brussels has been in operation since ????. Representation 
was carried out on behalf of the EC by the country holding 
the Community presidency (which rotates between the Twelve on 
a six monthly basis). Or occasionally (and usually signifyilig 
a new crisis) through a visiting EC "Troika" (3—5 member 
state Foreign Ministers acting on behalf of the Community's 
foreign policy). This intermediary arrangement was modified 
in February 1991 when the EC established a Programme 
Coordination Office in Pretoria which became responsible for 
the new Special Programme projects noted above. This is 
currently a small scale operation. However, in June 1993 it 
was confirmed that once a TEC was in place a full EC 
Commission Delegation would open in South Africa, hopefully 
sometime in 1994. Such a Delegation would be emblematic of a 
normalization of relations; indeed, possibly of a privileged 
relationship as EC Delegations are not situated in all third 
countries (including my own country of New Zealand which is 
currently cross-accredited from the Delegation in Canberra!). 
Following examples elsewhere in the world, normalization 
would also allow for a comprehensive and strong political 
dialogue to be established. This would cover questions of 
regional security, human rights and non—proliferation. This 
process may take the form of annual bilateral meetings 
between the Twelve, or a Troika, and the South African 
Government. 
Further evidence of institutionalization was apparent in 
October 1992 with the establishment of the EC Observers 
Mission to South Africa (ECOMSA). This fifteen person group 
has the task to observe and assist the peace process and 
works closely with the other international observer missions 
already in existence and the National Peace Accord 
structures. This innovation is also indicative of the EC's 
continued desire to become an active international actor, 
despite the debilitating experiences of the Gulf War and the 
war 'in the former Yugoslavia. 
So, a continued development commtiitmnent and an 
institutionalization of relations are two clear and 
relatively uncontroversial aspects of the EC's new approach. 
The remaining two issues - regional issues and future trading 
relations — are more complex, problematic and at yet, 
indeterminate. 
3.The shape of •the new relationshth reaionally. bilaterally 
or within Lomné 
First, irrespective of the type of formal relationship chosen 
for a trade regime between the EC and South Africa, the new 
framework will have to be complementary with the Ec's 
relations with the regional SADC states. Past ommnunity 
policy has treated the region as a whole; future policy will 
P 
retain this principle as a guiding criterion. Thus the kinds 
of preferences negotiated, quotas, development assistance 
will be regionally balanced. 
Second, one of the founding ideas and objectives of the EC is 
to promote the concept of regional integration. Consequently, 
not only will the EC strive to create regional compatibility, 
the EC would assist in creating a form of regional 
integration that linked South Africa within the SADC concept. 
However, the central question for the immediate future is the 
kind of bilateral relationship between the EC and South 
Africa that will be established in 1994 to normalize trading 
relations. Tii key decision has yet to be taken and the EC 
and South Africa are currently in discussions. What is clear 
at this stage is that the EC is not attempting to impose a 
format upon South Africa; but nor is the EC completely 
compliant. The initial step is South Africa's responsibility, 
in particular whether South Africa wishes to be classified as 
a developed OECD country or as some kind of developing 
country. Once this is determined then the options for 
bilateral economic relations are simplified. 
The options at the beginning of 1993 were as follows: 
1) the standard 'Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status within 
the GATT framework; 
2) the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); 
3) full Lomé status. 
4) "associate" Lomé status; 
5) a non-reciprocal association agreement; or, 
6) a reciprocal association agreement; 
Which of these is the most likely to be adopted and what are 
the implications for each option (see, Goodison 1992; 
Stevens, Kennan and Ketley, 1993). 
Beginning with the least likely outcomes, MFN status has the 
virtue of being the simplest option for the EC as it requires 
no change in current GAPT relations, classifying South Africa 
as a developed country as has been the case since the 1950s. 
However, this approach would simply reassert the economic 
status quo; do nothing to address South Africa's development 
needs; fail to stimulate European investment; and continue to 
hinder the intra—regional production of exports to the EC. 
The effects of changing to a GSP system are difficult to 
assess, especially as the EC is currently revising its 
approach. Essentially, like the MFN, it provides few 
advantages beyond South 1frica's existing position and would 
be chosen only if other more preferential optibs prove 
impossible to negotiate. 
Much has been speculated about the third possibility, namely 
full Lomé status for South Africa. This option seems 
increasingly unlikely despite specific trade advantages that 
such a framework would offer. Indeed, Lomé would probably 
offer the greatest trade preferences to the Republic and 
South African membership would also assist regional 
cooperation by placing the Republic on the caine economic 
trading plateau with the EC as the SADC states. The argument 
against membership focuses once again on South Africa's 
imprecise developed/developing classification. South Africa's 
GDP would put it well above the other now 70 Lomé states; the 
commodities for which trade preferences are available would 
give South Africa an advantage over other Lomé states as well 
as possibly meet with resistance from certain member states 
who produce similar agricultural products as South Africa. 
The Sysmin and Stabex Lomé schemes could not financially 
accommodate South Africa, and perhaps most crucially of all, 
to gain accession to the Lamé Convention South Africa would 
nee. the unanimous assent of all the other 70 signatories as 
well as the EC's agreement. It is far from certain that all 
other Loxné countries would be willing to allow South Africa 
to join. The parallel with South Africa within SADC is 
instriictive: the size and strength of the South African 
economy would create an unequal unbalanced relationship. In 
addition, within the Community itself there is growing 
criticism of the entire Loiné framework and a suggestion that 
its global approach should be abandoned for more regionally 
specific arrangements separating out the various components 
of the ACP states. Adding the South African economy into an 
already under-funded and financially strained Loiné might 
precipitate the early death of Lone. 
because Lamé offers the greatest economic advantages, a 
fourth option that was floated in early 1993 was for an 
associated status. No other such status exists and no one has 
really specified what such a relationship would amount to, or 
how it might differ from full membership or a bilateral 
association agreement. Consequently, the option seems 
unlikely to be considered seriously. 
Thus we are left with the option of a specific bilateral 
agreement that offers reciprocal terms. The EC's internal 
economic difficulties make a non-reciprocal arrangement 
highly unlikely (and indeed questionable under GATT rules). 
This would take the form of a free trade agreement geared 
specifically to South Africa's needs: the negative side for 
South Africa might be the requirement to dismantle certain 
procectionist measures in exchange for EC market access. The 
Commission's External Economic affairs directorate has argued 
strongly for such a line in keeping with the EC's oonunjtmnent 
to trade liberalization and competition. Negotiating such an 
agreement could be time consuming. Yet this appears to be the 
most likely cption, particularly as the EC ha already 
negotiated similar agreements with comparable states, most 
p notably with Lain America, particularly Brazil. The 
implications here are that beyond the existing Special 
Programme, further development aid would not be forthcoming: 
the emphasis on EC policy would be on promoting economic 
cooperation, industrial cooperation and trade and investment 
promotion. Thus despite the probable negative consequences 
for regional integration, such an approach seems the most 
likely at the moment, despite the greater development and 
preferential advantages under Lomné. 
The question of what type of relationship is not of 
importance just for South Africa: it is also of significance 
within the Community, especially the Commissior. Through out 
1993 there has been an internal bureaucratic battle between 
three directorates within the Coriunissiori as to how South 
Africa should be treated: who wins the bureaucratic battle 
will have an important agenda—setting role in shaping the 
future economic relationship. The protagonists are Sir Leon 
Brittan, Commissioner responsible for xternal EconOmic 
Relations (and a promoter of normal trade liberalization); 
Hans van den Broek, the Commissioner responsible or External 
Political Relations; and Manual Mann, Commissioner. for 
Development (responsible currently for the Special Programme 
and for Lomé). Thus as was the case during the sanctions 
period; Soutb Africa's future could be determined by Internal 
EC disputes over competences and authority as much as by the 
real needs of hè country. 
While I suggest that the normalization of relations is 
imminent, this will not by itself be an adequate panacea 
leading to nirvana. Negotiating a normal bilateral 
association agreement will be difficult, disputes will 
surface, as they do in all, trade relations between the EC and 
third countries. South Africa should not anticipate any 
linger post—apartheid sentimentality on the part of the 
Community. South Africa will be treated as fairly or as 
harshly as any other comparable third country particularly 
yr 
where goods are of a sensitive nature given Europe's own 
economic recession. From the Community perspective, EC 
interests are, quite naturally, paramount. To conclude I 
would like to return to my opening theme and quote from Sir 
Leon Brittan who offered a "sober look at the reality of 
today's South Africa". He warned against a number of myths 
about the future South Africa: first of 
inflated expectations ... concerning the role of 
the international community in the reconstruction 
of South Africa's economy and social tissue ... how 
much can the EC realistically achieve in terms of 
its development contribution to South Africa in the 
coining years? I don't have a ready anEwer, but I 
wish to caution against unlimited hopes and demands 
in this respect, at a time of worldwide recession 
and endless multiplication of emergencies around 
the globe. 
Second, Sir Leon cautz.oned against the expectation of renewed 
massive foreign investment from Europe. Even were the 
Important, if intangible, "country risk" factor reduced to an 
acceptable level, 
the prospects of a fair return on the investment will 
remain the decisive factor for any private investor's 
choice... Every investor has a huge range of investment 
options today. Few will risk investing in South Africa 
unless there is security ... and a favourable and 
competitive business environment and confidence. 
Sir Leon gave a clear indication of the Commission's position 
by calling for South Africa 
to start phasing out all of the outdated 
protectionist apparatus ... the deliberate pursuit 
of import-substitution policies is fundamentally at 
odds with the very principles on which the 
multilateral trading system is based ... protection 
is not the right answer. South Africa will stay 
longer in the economic doldrums unless it trades 
more. 
Thus the normalization of relations between the EC and South 
Afrca goes beyond the removal of sanctions and the 
establishment of a political dialogue: it incorporates a 
fundamental realignment in South Africa's international 
perspective with mainstream liberal market econbmics. 
Without any such adaptation, Couunurzity — South African 
relations mat find themselves in an unsatisfactory tate of 
limbo for the remainder of this century, if not longer. 
a 
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1I(MPL KLLA1IUrIZ LISSONS AND IMPUCATIONS FOR SA 
EC/Eastern Europe 
Trade Relations: 
Lessons and implications 
for South Africa 
The Eastern European countries, like South Africa, are in a political 
and economic transition. The transitional character of these societies 
has created the need to redefine trade relationships with EC, and the 
world for that matter, and to give increasing attention to the critical 
role of trade, or more specifically exports as a medium for economic 
development. 
In Eastern Europe, most observers are unanimous that 
reconstruction of these countries into market-based economies is 
closely dependent on their ability to form close relationships with the 
EC. Similarly, for South Africa, trade relations with the EC are very 
important. Firstly, the European market is currently South Africa's 
most important market constituting an estimated 40% of South 
Africa's total trade and 20% of the country's total exports. There is a 
view that quota and duty-free access to EC market could have a 
beneficial impact on investment, exports and employment. 
Neither South Africa nor Eastern Europe were part of the hierarchy 
of trade preferences granted by the EC. However, while some 
progress has already been made with regard to market access for 
Eastern European countries, through association agreements, no 
trade concessions have been granted to South Africa yet. Under 
scrutiny are three likely options for South Africa: firstly, a tailor-made 
bilateral trade agreement with the EC; secondly, a total package deal 
such as Lomé Convention; and finally, a special arrangement for 
Southern Africa, including South Africa, based on the Lomé 
Convention. 
EC assistance in the form of market access and aid measures to the 
CEECs is informed by a mixture of political and economic factors. 
The EC wishes to encourage change in Eastern Europe on the 
grounds that such change would improve the long-term security and 
stability of Europe. There is a firm believe that economic progress in 
the CEECs will be beneficial to the EC as economic adversity in 
these countries could be a strain on Western Europe owing, 
principally, to close geographical proximity. Such progress, it is 
believed, can only be achieved by a transition to a market economy 
and a pluralist democracy congruent with the Western European 
model. 
Relations with Southern Africa remains important for the EC. With 
South Africa being the most powerful country in the region, its 
importance for the EC must not be under-estimated. It is clear that 
the pressure for EC assistance towards Southern Africa is not as great 
as in the case of the CEECS, but nevertheless remains important. 
In particular, the EC is keen to encourage the integration of 
South Africa into the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). 
EASTERN EUROPE 
The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) including 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia differ in various ways; in their 
institutional ties with the West, the level of marketisation or different 
levels in their economic reforms, their profile of exports and imports, 
and different foreign trade regimes. Countries such as Poland and 
Hungary are more comparable to South Africa, in terms of industrial 
structure than Bulgaria or Romania. However, as far as trade flows to 
the EC are concerned, South Africa is more comparable to the latter 
countries. 
One of the most important challenges facing Eastern European 
countries is their full integration into the multilateral trade system 
that will depend, amongst other factors, on further progress in their 
own reforms as well as increased and more secure access to western 
markets. 
While most Eastern European countries are GATT members, their 
economic systems did not allow them fully to meet the GAIT 
requirements on reciprocity, non-discrimination and transparency 
and in the absence of the market, caused adoption of special 
safeguards by other members to guard against possible dumping by 
stare-trading organisations. 
EC AND CEEC TRADE FLOWS 
Eastern European countries have a legacy of poor integration into the 
markets of the West. In 1988, at least two-thirds of trade of these 
countries took place within the socialist bloc through the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). With the disappearance of 
the CMEA arrangements and the transition to market economies, 
the pattern of trade of Eastern Europe is changing substantially. 
The collapse of the CMEA trading system has had several 
repercussions. 
Firstly, it has hit the exports of all Eastern European states, 
especially Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, which had the highest share 
of their trade with socialist partners. 
Secondly, the commodity compositions of exports to the CMEA 
and Western markets are significantly different. Most exports to the 
EC are classified sensitive products - these are iron and steel, farm 
products, chemicals, textiles, clothing and footwear. 
Thirdly, partly as a result of the collapse of the CMEA, a large 
proportion of Central and Eastern European exports go to the EC. 
For example, dose to 503'o of the total exports of the Visegrad 
counties (the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) goes to the EC. 
South Africa exports predominantly primary commodities to the EC. 
Approximately 70% of South Africa's export earnings comes from 
mining, of which gold accounts for about one-half. Other export 
items include metal ores and metal products (24%), diamonds (9%), 
food and livestock (7°h), coal (5%) and chemicals (4%). South 
Africa's major exports to the EC in value terms, in 1992, were 
mineral products just over 3 billion, followed by base metals with a 
value close to R 2 billion, precious and semi-precious stones and 
vegetable products. 
In comparing the commodity composition of exports of SA and 
CEECs to the EC it is clear that both export predominantly primary 
products to the latter. South Africa's principle exports to the EC are 
primary products such as gold, coal, platinum and diamonds. The 
principal exports of the CEECS to the EC include primely products 
but these are predominantly, in decreasing importance, food and 
agricultural products, clothing and textiles and iron and steel. 
TURN TO PAGE 5 
EC TRADE REGIME 
The EC has a complex hierarchy of trade preferences towards 
different country's depending on a host of historical, political, 
geographical and economic factors. 
I EC Trade Regime Towards the CEECs 
Prior to the association agreements the CEECs generally faced 
more barriers (tariff and non-tari) than did developing and 
Mediterranean countries from the EC. After being near the base 
of the EC hierarchy of trade preferences, current changes in 
Eastern Europe, however, have lcd to a change of the EC stance 
towards the CEECs. 
During the past three years industrial countries have taken a 
number of steps to improve access of Eastern Europe to their 
markets. The EC had moved towards free trade by applying the 
GSP scheme and removing and suspending most of its quotas 
on imports of industrial products - with the important exceptions 
of textiles, steel and coal - from East European countries. 
Major changes in EC relations with Eastern Europe have 
occurred since 1988. The EC entered in separate Cooperation 
Agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland 
and Rumania. The EC accorded Hungary and Poland GSP 
status in Jan 1990. This was extended in October to Bulgaria 
and Czechoslovakia. In Jan 1991, the more limited version 
previously granted to Romania was upgraded to be on par with 
those of the others. 
Trade association agreements with these countries were to 
provide for a move to freer trade between EC and these 
countries in most manufactured products. These agreements are 
asymmetric in the sense that trade liberalisation and the removal 
of obstacles will be reciprocal but timetables will differ. These 
agreements involve a ten year programme in which quotas and 
tariffs on Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Polish goods are to 
be progressively removed in the first five years, and these 
countries remove their barriers on goods from the EC in the 
following five years. 
Owing to increasing pressure on the EC to provide more serious 
concessions and to shorten the time-frame of EC market access 
than the current ones allow, a recent agreement reached at the 
Copenhagen summit of the EC on 2 1-22 June stated that duties 
will be abolished on industrial, mainly chemical products after 
two years rather than 4, and on products such as footwear, 
glassware, electrical goods after 3 years rather than five. Duties 
for textile products will be abolished after five years rather than 
six. Steel duties are also likely to be abolished earlier. Moreover, 
a 10% increase in agricultural quotas is to take place six month 
earlier than planned, as is the 60% cut in duties or levies within 
these quotas. 
Despite the association agreements a number of problems 
Firstly, protection limits remain in force on CEEC exports of 
so-called sensitive' goods which often represent the sole means 
for these countries to compensate for sharp falls in formerly 
staple exports to the old Soviet bloc. 
Secondly, the EC's trade surplus with the five core countries in 
the region (now six following the break-up of Czechoslovakia) 
rose Ecu2.5bu last year from Ecul .4bn in 1991. During the 
previous years, up to 1990, the EC ran a deficit with the region. 
However, this may not be directly as a result of the association 
agreements, rather reflecting the increased imports by CEECS 
as a result of liberalisation of their economies. 
Thirdly, the rules of origin contained in the agreements impose 
a local content requirement of 60% for CEECs. Only goods 
which originate in the CEEC qualify for any improvement in 
access under these agreements. It is important to note that 
imported material from the EC is exempted from the local 
content requirement. However, the EC differentiates between 
two groups in Eastern Europe. It treats the Visegrad group 
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) on the one hand, and 
Bulgaria and Romania on the other, as separate economic areas, 
discouraging (re>. integration through trade among these former 
members of the now-defunct C.MEA. For example, an 
intermediate import from Romania into Poland does not qualify 
for rules of origin. 
• EC's Trade Regime Towards South Africa 
South Africa currently enjoys most favoured nation status 
(MFN) with the EC, which ensures that a tariff reduction to 
any one country is offered to all other countries that are GATT 
members. SA's exclusion from the EC's web of trade preferences 
stems from its apartheid regime, sanctions and the formal 
classification of the country as a developed economy by the 
GATT when it is in fact a middle-income developing country. 
However, the move towards a democratic regime in South 
Africa against a background of deep-rooted socio-economic 
problems gives it a legitimate claim for external encouragement 
and assistance' from the EC. 
The extension of trade preferences to the CEECs represents a 
competitive disadvantage for South Africa, since the CEECS 
were once a group that were competing in the EC without trade 
preferences. 
The current debate with regard to trade preferences for South 
TURN TO PAGE 8 
TRADE RELATION: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SAt CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4 5 
TABLE 1 
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF MAJOR EXPORTS 
TO TUE EC FROM POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 
HUNGARY AND SOUTH AFRICA 
1990 (I. OF TOTAL) 
POLAND 
Food and agricultural products: 21.0 
Textiles and clothing; 11.3 
Iron and Steel: 8.9 
Other products 58.9 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Food and agricultural products: 7.6 
Textiles and clothing: 10.7 
Iron and Steel: 15.2 
Other products 66.5 
HUNGARY 
Food and agricultural products: 23.8 
Textiles and clothing: 15.7 
Iron and Steel: 8.3 
Other products 52.5 
SOUTH AFRICAN TO THE EC FOR 1992 ('1, OF TOTAL) 
Mineral Products 20.7 
Food and agricultural products: 16.3 
Base Metals 12.3 
Precious ad semi-precious stones: 15.2 
Other products 40.6 
SOURCE: European Economy, No 521993 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 TRADE RELATION: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SAt CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5 
Africa has mainly focused on the possibility of South Africa 
becoming part of Lomé. However, there exists a doubt in 
various quarters whether this would be a feasible option. 
Another option, many policy-makers argue, is a bilateral 
association agreement with the EC outside of Lomé. There is 
some uncertainty regarding the future of Lomé in the light of the 
gradual evolution of EC trade policy. For example, there is some 
suggestion that the EC is moving from a differentiated trade 
regime to regionally specific regimes. 
However, were South Africa to be admitted to the EC's 
hierarchy of trade preference three important factors need to be 
taken into consideration: firstly, a limited number of non- 
primary products from South Africa are considered to be 
competitive in the European market. These are processed 
agricultural products, engineering 
goods and some clothing itcms 
secondly, sugar, beef and wine arc 
products in which South Africa 
competes in other export markets, 
but which are largely excluded from 
the EC market by the high level of 
CAP protection; finally, three of 
South Africa's major commodity 
exports enter the EC without any 
major barriers: these are gold, 
diamonds and platinum. In fact, 
there is no advantage for any 
form of preference for about 60% 
of the EC's imports from 
South Africa. 
Where the CEECs will gain 
immediately in tariff-free access and 
the elimination of TQs over GSP- 
beneficiaries is in the standard 
products, mainly non-ferrous metals 
(such as copper and aluminium) 
chemicals, fibreboard and plywood. 
They will gain through the immediate 
abolition of TQs for semi-sensitive and 
sensitive products i.e. iron and steel 
products, footwear and non-MFA 
textiles. 
In the case of South Africa, products 
most likely to benefit from a 
preferential trade regime (such as 
Lomé) are deciduous fruits and new 
fruits, vegetable and flower products; 
paper products such as uncoated craft 
paper and paper board; leather 
products; engineering products such 
as catalytic converters; and, at least in 
the short-run, some chemicals. 
South African coal, in particular, faces 
important barriers to the EC 
(Page and Stevens, 1992). 
If South Africa became a far more 
significant exporter of manufactured 
products to the EC it could face 
substantial competition from the 
CEECs. Countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary 
currently export a range of 
manufactures such as chemicals and 
other semi-manufactures, and light 
manufactures such as clothing and 
footwear. The importance of 
manufactured exports relative to primary exports from both 
South Africa and countries such as 
Poland and Hungary, to the EC is increasing. 
Both SA and the CEECs are experiencing considerable 
restructuring of their industries and competition is likely to 
develop in the long term more in manufactured products. 
At this stage it seems that CEECs will not pose a competitive 
threat to South Africa in the short-term, though this could 
happen in the long term. 
TURN TO PAGE 9 








01 Live Animals 385991 191265 194726 
02 Vegetable Products 1452563 327960 1124603 
03 Animal Fats 9453 43542 -34089 
04 Prepared Foodstuffs 717877 348350 369527 
05 Mineral Products 3297828 117613 3180215 
06 Chemical Products 798201 3488575 .2690374 
07 Plastics 109845 1218574 -1108729 
08 Hides and Skins 295117 73371 221746 
09 Wood & wood prod 137160 80820 56340 
10 Pulps 571697 753965 -182268 
11 Textiles 841645 715287 126358 
12 Footwear, Headgear, etc 28135 48337 -20202 
13 Stone, plaster, cement 114152 414820 -300668 
14 Precious & semi-precious stones 1634266 227810 1406456 
15 Base Metals 1963031 1215226 747805 
16 Machinery & appliances 721991 7485447 -6763456 
17 Vehicles and others 843184) 2975731 -2132551 
18 Optical, photographic. etc 71116 1079840 -1008724 
20 Miscellaneous manufactures 165671 212601 .46930 
21 Art & antiques 8415 17215 -8800 
22 Other classified goods 1764684 85638 1679046 
TOTAL 15932018 21121987 -5189969 
Source for all three tables: RSA Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics, 
January-December 1992. 
Note: For all three tables 'un-classified' trade includes gold, arms and oil. 
TRADE RELATION: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 5Az CQNTINUaU ?Km TbW 
AID 
The orientation of Western aid is to faciliiate the reforms in the 
CEECs and to assist in reintegrating their economies in the world 
economy. There are mainly three types of aid measures: easier 
market access for industrial products, technical assistance for 
economic restructuring and financial assistance for macroeconomic 
stabilisation. 
Aid, on the part of the EC, has met with limited success in Eastern 
Europe. An aid programme, initially for Poland and Hungary but 
extended to other CEECs, was established in 1989 by the group of 
24 OECD countries called PHARE (Poland and Hungary 
aid for economic reconstruction). The main aim of PHARE was to 
assist the process of reform to a market economy. Some of the 
criticisms against this programme are the following: firstly, slow 
disbursement of funds; secondly, heavy reliance on costly 
consultants from northern EC states and thirdly, problems 
of bureaucratic procedures and a lack of qualified 
specialist know-how. 
The ability of CEECs to increase their exports depends, to a large 
extent, on import-intensive investment requirements. Increasingly 
donor countries and multilateral institutions who provide 
concessional finance or aid to recipient countries are concerned with 
the latter countries' abilities to service their debt by encouraging 
export capacity. Financial and technical assistance could 
have very beneficial effects on the CEECs long-term 
trade prospects. 
• Trade Finance 
Current calls for trade finance to the CEECS are related to the 
need to prevent a breakdown of intra-regional trade which is 
causing severe adjustment problems for Eastern European 
countries. As the former Soviet Union (FSU) shifts a significant 
share of imports of manufactured goods away from traditional 
suppliers in Eastern Europe, it is causing great concern to the 
latter. Intra-regional trade is also being discouraged because of 
the lack of convertible currency amongst these countries. Firms 
in the former CMEA region will prefer to export their goods and 
services outside the region rather than within the region, because 
they know that buyers in the region are less likely to be able to 
pay in convertible currency. 
The other important form of assistance is through the provision 
of export credit facilities which, among other things, plays a very 
important role in allowing firms that lack finance to import to 
facilitate exports by, for example, the purchase of the modern 
technology. Part of the problem, however, is that it will be very 
difficult for CEECs to attract private-sector trade credits against 
a background of debt rescheduling. 
I Technical Assistance 
The emphasis on technical assistance to CEECs stems from the 
fact that these countries are undergoing a transition from 
planned to market economies. Such far-reaching changes 
requires a fundamental restructuring of institutions such as the 
financial services, marketing, legal system, etc, as well as the 
development of new institutions such as to facilitate trade and 
currency convertibility. For example, more detailed industrial 
research in individual CEECs show that institutions to assist 
export promotion are badly needed owing to the lack of culture 
of exporting to Western markets. 
South Africa, by contrast, does not require some of the technical 
assistance that is quite critical to the success of the CEECs. It 
has highly developed financial services, marketing skills and 
various other institutions that are pivotal to export success. 
Clearly, South Africa has a different set of problems which are 
related more to a small white elite that controls such institutions. 
Hence it is not surprising that a large proportion of EC aid to 
South Africa is devoted to training and development of the 
disenfranchised majority. 
The EC has an established grant finance programme of 
assistance to South Africa. The country currently receives an 
estimated 90 million ECU, which finances anti-apartheid and 
development programmes through NOOs. It is important to 
note that South Africa is a recipient of the EC's largest single 
programmable development initiative in Africa. Moreover, the 
EC is also the largest international donor of external assistance 
to South Africa. It is unlikely that the EC will be willing to 
allocate much more than that to South Africa, pariicularly in the 
light of rising demands from Eastern Europe. 
LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
In general there are many lessons to be learnt for South Africa from 
EC relations with the CEECS. First and foremost, South African 
policy -makers must show an appreciation of the limitations of EC's 
trade preferences such as a prolonged time-tabling of the 
liberalisation process on the part of the EC, coupled with limited 
concessions for sensitive products, the ready use of contingent 
protection measures such as anti-dumping, and constraints imposed 
by the rules of origin. 
The EC has through the rules of origin clause discouraged 
integration in the CEEC. In South Africa, by contrast, policy 
makers are emphasising suitable rules of origin in order to encourage 
the integration of South Africa into Southern Africa. South African 
accession to Lomé, for example, would encourage trade creation 
among ACP countries through intra-regional cumulation through 
rules of origin. 
The nature of preferential trade on the part of the EC both towards 
ACP countries and CEECS show that products in which these 
countries have a competitive advantage are precisely the ones where 
preferential trade is not as generous as the ones where they have a 
limited comparative advantage. 
It seems that from the experience of CEECS, if South Africa were to 
be granted certain trade concessions from the EC, it would have to 
reciprocate this by liberalising its own market. Market access is a 
form of aid which the EC grants by influencing the economic policies 
of recipient countries. The EC encourages liberalisarion both because 
it is a target market for EC exports and because it underpins the 
political and economic motives that informs its aid programme. 
An important mixture of political and economic factors informs 
BC's external assistance. In particular, the political urgency that 
underlies the EC's attempts to make concession with CEECS, is not 
as great in its relationship with South Africa. 
Market access as a form of aid is important, but should not override 
other important forms of assistance such as financial and technical 
aid. However, the kind of institutions that act as a conduit for 
external assistance are quite critical to the success of aid programmes. 
Finally CEECS are competing with South Africa on three levels: 
trade; direct investment and aid flows. In the long-term, preferential 
access to Western European markets, combined with the advantage 
of physical proximity could give CEECS a strong comparative 
advantage over South Africa both as a location for direct 
investment from BC firms as well as a competitor for products for 
EC markets. 
"The challenge for South Africa is to win an advantageous package of 
arrangement which will encourage growth and redistribution in 
South Africa and within the Southern Africa region." 0 R.C. 
(Thu is a shorrened verum of a paper w be published shorthj as a 
TPMP Working Paper) 
Opening address to the AWEPA/AEI Conference on 
Development and Democratisation: 
European—Southern African Partnership 
Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC 
Mr Chairman, honourable guests, and friends 
It gives me a great deal of pleasure for me today to address a 
conference which clearly marks the transition of Southern 
Africa from a region subjected to cynical destabilisation by 
the apartheid regime, to a region moving rapidly towards 
democracy and, we believe, rapid social and economic 
development. 
Organisations like AWEPA stood by the disempowered in the 
region, mobilising democratic forces against apartheid at a 
time when many Western governments preferred too look the 
other way. Without the support of our friends in the European 
parliament, and in the parliaments of Europe, and in the 
churches, trade unions, and other organisations which worked 
tirelessly to embarrass, weaken, and ultimately isolate the 
cruel Nationalist regime in South Africa, the struggle for 
freedom would have been drawn out much longer. 
The struggle for freedom has reached a turning point, but we 
are not yet at the final bend. The achievement of political 
freedom, of democracy in our country, is only the first step 
towards the final and absolute eradication of apartheid. 
Apartheid wreaked havoc on our society, which was already 
damaged by a vicious form of colonialism. Colonial South 
Africa was marked by a widespread system of racial slavery, 
and deeply wounded by war upon war of conquest and 
dispossession. Chattel slavery gave way to wage slavery on the 
mines and the farms, and then the system of discrimination was 
extended to every facet of society, from the right to vote to 
the right to travel in a racially exclusive ambulance, from 
the right to learn, to the right to buy land or own a 
business. 
It would be foolish to underestimate the deep effects of years 
of oppression on our society. The commitment made on several 
occasions by the European Community to support for the 
complete eradication of apartheid is no small commitment. And 
that is why the theme of this workshop is so appropriate: 
'Development and Democratisation'. 
Development and democracy are twins that must succeed together 
in our region, or both fail. Without democracy we cannot get 
development. Totalitarian regimes like apartheid create 
islands of privilege for those in control and their 
supporters, but the sea of discontent that surrounds them will 
inevitably surge over them. In other words, without democracy, 
effective development will not take place, and soon enough the 
society concerned will be unable to reproduce itself. 
Democratic societies create the conditions for the social and 
economic development of all of their citizens, but if they 
cannot deliver the goods, the democracy will weaken. 
In Southern Africa we are moving rapidly towards democracy, 
but our democracy will be fragile unless we can deliver 
tangible social and economic benefits, and deliver them 
quickly. 
There is no doubt that the end of apartheid will yield its own 
dividends. The energies of people oppressed and destabilised 
for many years will be released, and will produce its own 
magic. I have no doubt that there is an enormous well of 
talent in our country and in our region that, when tapped, 
will bring forth a new dynamism. In the successful small 
farmers of Zimbabwe, and the fiercely competitive taxi owners 
in South Africa (for example), we find a desire for a better 
life underpinned by a zeal for self-improvement. In rural 
cooperatives and urban stokvels we find abundant evidence of 
the power of collective action even in our most deprived 
communities. But desire, zeal, and commitment will not be 
enough to overcome the fearsome legacy of three hundred years 
of colonialism, and forty five years of systematic 
discrimination and oppression. 
This is why we are asking our partners against apartheid in 
organisations like AWEPA to become our partners in the 
struggle for social and economic development in Southern 
Africa. Europe can play a very important role in the 
development and democratisation process in Southern Africa. In 
the first place, our European friends can help us ensure that 
a democratic election is accomplished in South Africa, and 
that democracy is seen to be done. Two of our immediate 
concerns are the process of voter education in South Africa 
and the function of monitoring the election. 
Most South Africans have never voted in a formal election, and 
none have ever participated in a democratic election. We need 
to help our citizens understand the electoral process, and to 
understand the system of representative democracy. at a 
regional and national level. In this respect, voter education 
programmes can help pave the way towards democracy. 
But voter need to believe that they will be allowed to 
exercise their freedom of choice in an environment free of 
coercion. For this reason we need an extensive election 
monitoring system which is supported by neutral outsiders that 
can assure all parties that they are able to help ensure that 
a free and fair election takes place. 
In both voter education and election monitoring, the European 
Community and its individual members can make an invaluable 
contribution. 
But the election is just the first step towards democracy. the 
next step entails social and economic development. We must 
ensure that as soon as the election is over, if not sooner, 
that mechanisms are in place to enable our poorest and most 
angry communities to make social and economic progress. I am 
not only talking about providing fresh water and electricity 
to poor communities; I am also talking about generating 
activities which help build new institutions of social 
cohesion and development at the grassroots of our society. 
In the past schemes like the European Community's Special 
Programme Against Apartheid have begun to help us rebuild 
communities torn apart by apartheid. We have only begun this 
task. Economic and institutional development at the grassroots 
level will be the key to nurturing democracy in our society. 
We hope that our friends in AWEPA and similar organisations 
can help us ensure that successful forms of cooperation 
between the European Community and South Africa, such as the 
Special Programme, are continued and strengthened during our 
phase of building democracy. 
But assistance, whether economic or technical, will not be 
enough. We must ensure that Southern Africa develops the 
capacity to look after itself in all respects in the long run. 
The key to long—term development and democratisation is self— 
sustaining economic growth. For our region, one of the 
critical components of long term economic growth will be our 
deeper involvement in international markets for trade and 
investment. 
At present South Africa is one of a relatively small number of 
countries which have extensive trading relations with Europe 
but no special trading arrangements. Currently, forty percent 
of our imports come from Europe and, excluding gold, thirty 
percent of our exports go to Europe. If South Africa is to 
grow and develop, the volume of trade between South Africa and 
Europe must rise and will rise. We would benefit from 
exporting more and more to Europe, and Europe would benefit 
too, not only through access to an efficient, reliable 
supplier, but because South Africa imports more capital goods 
and intermediate products from the EC than from any other 
region, and the EC will undoubtedly get a major dividend out 
of our development. 
We hope that the European Community will see its way clear to 
removing unnecessary obstacle that might exist in the way of 
trade between our two regions. We also hope that the EC will 
facilitate the economic integration of our region by admitting 
products which have components from all Southern African 
countries, including South Africa, admission to Europe on the 
equivalent terms to items that qualify in terms of the rules 
of origin provisions of the Loiné Convention. If South Africa 
is treated, for trading purposes, differentially from our 
neighbours, who are all members of the Lomé Convention, 
regional integration in Southern Africa will be seriously 
inhibited, and regional growth will be slowed down. 
However our new trading relations with Europe are 
institutionalised, whether it is directly through the Lomé 
Convention or through an institution more loosely tied to 
Lomé, we hope that it will facilitate greater trade between 
our two regions, Southern Africa and the European Community, 
as regions. 
So, we have now only begun to set out on the journey towards 
the total eradication of apartheid from our region of Southern 
Africa. We have just begun to create a democracy, and to put 
in place the developmental processes that will ensure its 
growth. The path is long, but we can see it very clearly now. 
Our final objective of a just and equitable society is 
visible, and we are certain that it is attainable. One of the 
most important ingredients for success will undoubtedly 
deepened cooperation and partnership between Southern Africa 
and the European Community, and this must be accomplished in 
the near future. I am certain that those of us assembled in 
this hall today can and will make a critical contribution to 
progress in European/Southern African cooperation. I hope that 
this conference will be but one step out of many initiatives 
to strengthen our ties. 
Thank you. 
Opening address to the AWEPA/AEI Conference on 
Development and Democratisation: 
European—Southern African Partnership 
Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC 
Mr Chairman, honourable guests, and friends 
It gives me a great deal of pleasure for me today to address a 
conference which clearly marks the transition of Southern 
Africa from a region subjected to cynical destabilisation by 
the apartheid regime, to a region moving rapidly towards 
democracy and, we believe, rapid social and economic 
development. 
Organisations like AWEPA stood by the disempowered in the 
region, mobilising democratic forces against apartheid at a 
time when many Western governments preferred too look the 
other way. Without the support of our friends in the European 
parliament, and in the parliaments of Europe, and in the 
churches, trade unions, and other organisations which worked 
tirelessly to embarrass, weaken, and ultimately isolate the 
cruel Nationalist regime in South Africa, the struggle for 
freedom would have been drawn out much longer. 
The struggle f or freedom has reached a turning point, but we 
are not yet at the final bend. The achievement of political 
freedom, of democracy in our country, is only the first step 
towards the final and absolute eradication of apartheid. 
Apartheid wreaked havoc on our society, which was already 
damaged by a vicious form of colonialism. Colonial South 
Africa was marked by a widespread system of racial slavery, 
and deeply wounded by war upon war of conquest and 
dispossession. Chattel slavery gave way to wage slavery on the 
mines and the farms, and then the system of discrimination was 
extended to every facet of society, from the right to vote to 
the right to travel in a racially exclusive ambulance, from 
the right to learn, to the right to buy land or own a 
business. 
It would be foolish to underestimate the deep effects of years 
of oppression on our society. The conunitinent made on several 
occasions by the European Community to support for the 
complete eradication of apartheid is no small commitment. And 
that is why the theme of this workshop is so appropriate: 
'Development and Democratisation'. 
Development and democracy are twins that must succeed together 
in our region, or both fail. Without democracy we cannot get 
development. Totalitarian regimes like apartheid create 
islands of privilege for those in control and their 
supporters, but the sea of discontent that surrounds them will 
inevitably surge over them. In other words, without democracy, 
effective development will not take place, and soon enough the 
society concerned will be unable to reproduce itself. 
Democratic societies create the conditions for the social and 
economic development of all of their citizens, but if they 
cannot deliver the goods, the democracy will weaken. 
In Southern Africa we are moving rapidly towards democracy, 
but our democracy will be fragile unless we can deliver 
tangible social and economic benefits, and deliver them 
quickly. 
There is no doubt that the end of apartheid will yield its own 
dividends. The energies of people oppressed and destabilised 
for many years will be released, and will produce its own 
magic. I have no doubt that there is an enormous well of 
talent in our country and in our region that, when tapped, 
will bring forth a new dynamism. In the successful small 
farmers of Zimbabwe, and the fiercely competitive taxi owners 
in South Africa (for example), we find a desire for a better 
life underpinned by a zeal for self—improvement. In rural 
cooperatives and urban stokvels we find abundant evidence of 
the power of collective action even in our most deprived 
communities. But desire, zeal, and commitment will not be 
enough to overcome the fearsome legacy of three hundred years 
of colonialism, and forty five years of systematic 
discrimination and oppression. 
This is why we are asking our partners against apartheid in 
organisations like AWEPA to become our partners in the 
struggle for social and economic development in Southern 
Africa. Europe can play a very important role in the 
development and democratisation process in Southern Africa. In 
the first place, our European friends can help us ensure that 
a democratic election is accomplished in South Africa, and 
that democracy is seen to be done. Two of our immediate 
concerns are the process of voter education in South Africa 
and the function of monitoring the election. 
Most South Africans have never voted in a formal election, and 
none have ever participated in a democratic election. We need 
to help our citizens understand the electoral process, and to 
understand the system of representative democracy at a 
regional and national level. In this respect, voter education 
programmes can help pave the way towards democracy. 
But voter need to believe that they will be allowed to 
exercise their freedom of choice in an environment free of 
coercion. For this reason we need an extensive election 
monitoring system which is supported by neutral outsiders that 
can assure all parties that they are able to help ensure that 
a free and fair election takes place. 
In both voter education and election monitoring, the European 
Community and its individual members can make an invaluable 
contribution. 
But the election is just the first step towards democracy. the 
next step entails social and economic development. We must 
ensure that as soon as the election is over, if not sooner, 
that mechanisms are in place to enable our poorest and most 
angry communities to make social and economic progress. I am 
not only talking about providing fresh water and electricity 
to poor communities; I am also talking about generating 
activities which help build new institutions of social 
cohesion and development at the grassroots of our society. 
In the past schemes like the European Community's Special 
Programme Against Apartheid have begun to help us rebuild 
communities torn apart by apartheid. We have only begun this 
task. Economic and institutional development at the grassroots 
level will be the key to nurturing democracy in our society. 
We hope that our friends in AWEPA and similar organisations 
can help us ensure that successful forms of cooperation 
between the European Community and South Africa, such as the 
Special Programme, are continued and strengthened during our 
phase of building democracy. 
But assistance, whether economic or technical, will not be 
enough. We must ensure that Southern Africa develops the 
capacity to look after itself in all respects in the long run. 
The key to long-term development and democratisation is self- 
sustaining economic growth. For our region, one of the 
critical components of long term economic growth will be our 
deeper involvement in international markets for trade and 
investment. 
At present South Africa is one of a relatively small number of 
countries which have extensive trading relations with Europe 
but no special trading arrangements. Currently, forty percent 
of our imports come from Europe and, excluding gold, thirty 
percent of our exports go to Europe. If South Africa is to 
grow and develop, the volume of trade between South Africa and 
Europe must rise and will rise. We would benefit from 
exporting more and more to Europe, and Europe would benefit 
too, not only through access to an efficient, reliable 
supplier, but because South Africa imports more capital goods 
and intermediate products from the EC than from any other 
region, and the EC will undoubtedly get a major dividend out 
of our development. 
We hope that the European Community will see its way clear to 
removing unnecessary obstacle that might exist in the way of 
trade between our two regions. We also hope that the EC will 
facilitate the economic integration of our region by admitting 
products which have components from all Southern African 
countries, including South Africa, admission to Europe on the 
equivalent terms to items that qualify in terms of the rules 
of origin provisions of the Lamé Convention. If South Africa 
is treated, for trading purposes, differentially from our 
neighbours, who are all members of the Loiné Convention, 
regional integration in Southern Africa will be seriously 
inhibited, and regional growth will be slowed down. 
However our new trading relations with Europe are 
institutionalised, whether it is directly through the Lomé 
Convention or through an institution more loosely tied to 
Lamé, we hope that it will facilitate greater trade betwe en 
our two regions, Southern Africa and the European Community, 
as regions. 
So, we have now only begun to set out on the journey towards 
the total eradication of apartheid from our region of Southern 
Africa. We have just begun to create a democracy, and to put 
in place the developmental processes that will ensure its 
growth. The path is long, but we can see it very clearly now. 
Our final objective of a just and equitable society is 
visible, and we are certain that it is attainable. One of the 
most important ingredients f or success will undoubtedly 
deepened cooperation and partnership between Southern Africa 
and the European Community, and this must be accomplished in 
the near future. I am certain that those of us assembled in 
this hail today can and will make a critical contribution to 
progress in European/Southern African cooperation. I hope that 
this conference will be but one step out of many initiatives 
to strengthen our ties. 
Thank you. 
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1. Why ar. relations with Europe of key importanc. to South 
Africa? 
a) Europe is South Africa's most important trading and 
investment partner. Europe has always been South Africa's 
most important source of capital goods, which is linked 
to the fact that Europe has always been responsible for a 
majority of FDI in South Africa. It is also a significant 
source for consumer goods and intermediates. (Total 
imports from Europe according to South African sources 
(excluding secret items) amounted to R21 billion in 1992, 
or fully 40% of South Africa's imports. If the South 
African economy begins to grow again, imports from Europe 
are likely rise very significantly.] 
South African exports to the EC amounted to R16 billion 
in 1992 (25 % of exports). Adding in gold and including 
Switzerland in the EC would take that up to about R35 
billion (50% of exports). (Gold sales will to continue to 
decline for the reasons already mentioned. We would like 
to ensure that we are able to make up some of the loss in 
gold exports with exports of other products which would 
include agricultural products and, increasingly, 
manufactures.] 
b) Europe is playing a key role in South and Southern 
Africa as regards developmental assistance, through the 
Special Programme against Apartheid, and through Lone. 
The Special Programme, at ECU 90 million, is the largest 
single instance of EC programme aid, and South Africa's 
most important source of aid. The Lone programmes are key 
for Southern Africa. 
c) South Africa has strong cultural ties with Europe, 
through language, and in many other ways. South Africa also is host to a very large number of European citizens; 
notably citizens of Portugal and Britain. 
For these reasons, a strong and quick signal of strengthening 
ties of partnership and cooperation between Europe, South 
Africa, and its neighbours (i.e., those in SADC), can play a 
crucial role in giving greater stability to the transition 
process in the region. 
2. What would we South African. lik, to us in a new 
arrangement with Europe? 
In general, we would like to see a consolidation of existing 
relations, but also a widening of these relations, and a 
harmonisation of relations between Europe and the region. 
Specifically: 
a) Trade and investment: 
i) Clearly the GATT is the key to growing world 
trade, and the ANC sees its strengthening as 
essential if world economic growth is to resume with 
vigour in the 1990s. We hope the EC will contribute 
to the strengthening of the GATT. 
ii) But we also desire a special relationship with 
Europe, one which will support our endeavour to 
become a growing, outward looking country and 
region. South Africa is developed in certain key 
respects: financial, telecommunications, and 
physical infrastructure for example; but it is a 
developing country too, in that 5/6 of our 
population lives under conditions resembling the 
inhabitants of poor developing countries. We are 
placed 70th on the UNDP scale of human development. 
Current estimates of unemployment range above 45%. 
Also, our region is underdeveloped, and our economy 
is integrally linked to those of our neighbours 
through permeable borders for goods and labour. 
* For these reasons we need to know that Europe will 
not close its borders to our labour absorbing 
economic activities; 
* and that the nature of our links with Europe will 
facilitate regional integration in Southern Africa 
through harmonising relations between ourselves and 
our neighbours, on the one hand, and the EC on the 
other hand. 
—> the obvious way to achieve this would be to 
extend the core market access provisions of Lomé IV, 
including the cumulation provisions of the Lone 
rules of origin, to South Africa, for the duration 
of the Convention. This could be accomplished 
within, or in parallel to the Lomé Convention. 
b) Aid 
—> We would expect, as far as aid is concerned, that 
the new arrangement provide for the extension of the 
Special Programme against Apartheid into the phase 
of building democracy. The EC has already indicated 
that it sees the extension of the Special Programme 
as an element of its recently renewed commitment to 
the complete eradication of Apartheid. We also 
understand that the EC is planning to continue the 
orientation of the programme towards institution 
building through non-governmental organisations. 
There is therefore already a great deal of agreement 
about this aspect of our new relationship, and it 
should not be hard to incorporate it into an 
arrangement. 
—> our desire to strengthen private sector economic 
development opens the way for other forms of 
cooperation with the EC, such as finding ways of 
encouraging FDI in South and Southern Africa 
(including partnerships with black South Africans, 
previously kept out of the market), and providing 
technical assistance for emerging businesses. 
C) cultural ties 
We would also expect a new arrangement to strengthen 
cultural ties between our two regions. 
3. How do we reach such an agreement? 
—> It will be appropriate to begin more detailed 
discussions after the Transitional Executive Council 
(TEC) sub—council on foreign affairs and establishes a 
framework for negotiations. Relations with the EC will 
undoubtedly be a high priority for the TEC. 
—> As soon after the April 27th election as possible, 
strengthened relations should be formalised. 
—> We are hoping for the full engagement of our 
neighbours in the process of negotiations, as well as 
extensive consultations with other members of the ACP 
group. It would be inappropriate to come to a new 
agreement with Europe designed to assist the Southern 
African region without the full engagement of the other 
countries of Southern Africa in the process. Whether or 
not the new arrangement is structured within the Lomé 
Convention or parallel to it, it will affect it,and we 
feel we should consult with members of the ACP group in 
the course of our negotiations. 
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